

SEPTEMBER—OCTOBER 1984

# Infantry

A PROFESSIONAL JOURNAL FOR THE COMBINED ARMS TEAM



CAN DO ONWARD WE LEAD THE WAY KING OF THE HILL STRIKE—HOLD  
 ALWAYS PREPARED VALOR FOR SERVICE REMEMBER THE ALAMO H-MINUS  
 STRIKE UNITY FOR SERVICE OUR COUNTRY, NOT OURSELVES FOR COUNTRY  
 TAKE ARMS HONOR AND COUNTRY KEEP UP THE FIRE FOR FREEDOM  
 THE ROCK OF THE MARNE WITH A MILITARY COURAGE WORTHY OF ADMIRATION  
 FIRST IN WAR — FIRST IN PEACE HONOR COMES FROM VIRTUE ON GUARD  
 LET'S GO LET VALOR NOT FAIL LOYALTY TO COUNTRY WILLING AND ABLE  
 VALOR AND FORCE UNITY IS STRENGTH FOLLOW US PLAY THE GAME  
 DRAGOONS ON THEIR OWN ACCORD WE SERVE VIGILANCE LOVE OF COUNTRY  
 GENTLE WHEN STROKED — FIERCE WHEN PROVOKED I SERVE BRAVE AND TRUE  
 STRAIGHT AND STALWART I'LL TRY, SIR DEEDS NOT WORDS ALWAYS FIRST  
 OLD VIRGINIA NEVER TIRES DON'T TREAD ON ME COURAGE AND FIDELITY  
 TO THE UTMOST EXTENT OF OUR POWER THE BAYONET DECIDES EVER READY  
 THE BEST LEAD THE REST WE CONQUER POWER AND MOUNTAINS GERONIMO  
 FIRST AT VICKSBURG THE RIGHT OF THE LINE WINGED ATTACK THE ROCK  
 RALLY ROUND THE FLAG LET HIM BEAR THE PALM WHO HAS WON IT EXCEL  
 DO NOT TOUCH ME THE ROCK OF CHICKAMAUGA DEATH BEFORE DISHONOR  
 FRIGHTENED BY NO DIFFICULTIES TRUTH AND COURAGE IT SHALL BE DONE  
 IF YOU WISH PEACE, PREPARE FOR WAR STANDS ALONE WE ARE READY  
 FURY FROM THE SKY TO THE LIMIT OF OUR ABILITY LOYALTY AND COURAGE  
 FLORIDA AND COUNTRY IN ALL THINGS PREPARED PREPARED TO GUARD  
 GO FOR BROKE ALL THE WAY LOVE OF COUNTRY CONQUERS STAND FORTH  
 STRENGTH FROM ABOVE TO THE LAST MAN LET THE CITIZENS BEAR ARMS  
 BREAK THROUGH ALWAYS READY WE'LL DO IT WIDE AWAKE — WIDE AWAKE  
 GOD AND I FOLLOW ME LIBERTY OR DEATH KEEP YOUR POWDER DRY  
 LET THE DRUM BEAT I WILL CAST MY SHOE OVER IT THE TERRIBLES DUTY  
 FORTITUDE AND COURAGE FOR COUNTRY AND GLORY BY VALOR, NOT BY WORDS  
 VIRTUE KINDLES STRENGTH EQUAL TO THE TASK STAND FAST UNDAUNTED  
 ONE COUNTRY — ONE FLAG WE ARE ABLE AND WILL CONQUER EVER FAITHFUL  
 THE DEVOTION OF EACH IS THE STRENGTH OF THE REGIMENT I'LL FACE YOU  
 NO STEP BACKWARD ARMS SECURE PEACE FIRST TO ASSEMBLE THE BRAVE  
 PREPARED IN ALL THINGS WE UPHOLD OUR ANCIENT HONORS EVER FORWARD  
 BELIEVE AND CONQUER WHEREVER MY COUNTRY CALLS GUIDE ON OUR TRACKS  
 UNITY, ALERTNESS, AND VALOR YIELD TO NONE COURAGE WITHOUT FEAR  
 SMILING WE COME HAVING BEEN LED BY LOVE OF COUNTRY ALWAYS FORWARD

# Infantry

A PROFESSIONAL JOURNAL FOR THE COMBINED ARMS TEAM

A Department of the Army Publication

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## FRONT COVER

From the beginning, the regiment has been the United States Infantry's key organizational element. It continues to be. Here are 120 mottoes of Infantry regiments. (Several of the mottoes are used by more than one regiment.) How many can you identify? (See page 38.)





**FLARE**

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# Commandant's NOTE



**Major General John W. Foss**

Chief of Infantry

## TRAINING THE LIGHT INFANTRY FORCE

As most infantrymen know by now, the Army is in the process of building its new light infantry divisions. It will begin by converting the 7th Infantry Division to the new structure by Fiscal Year 1985, and will add more light forces during the following years. Many infantrymen, however, may not understand what is really new and different about these new light organizations.

Forming a light infantry division is not simply a matter of taking away heavy weapons, support, and vehicles from a heavy division. It entails building a new organizational structure that makes the most of the infantry soldier's inherent mobility and of his physical and moral strength and toughness. It also means combining that footmobile force with our latest technology so that these units can go anywhere and be sustained there. Most important, it involves changing the tactics to capitalize on the new light infantry organizations. (Recent events such as the British action in the Falkland Islands and our own in Grenada emphasize the need for highly deployable forces. These actions also clearly demonstrate the effectiveness of properly trained and employed light infantry units.)

Accordingly, the Army plans to build light squads, platoons, and companies that will be able to accomplish all of the traditional infantry missions while making the best use of their ability to fight dispersed, aggressive small-unit actions. Raids, ambushes, infiltration, and night operations will be the normal mode of employment for these fighting units.

If our light units are to perform these missions successfully, we must first set very high standards of training for the people in them. Our soldiers must become expert marksmen and skilled navigators. They must be accomplished in the art of survival and skilled in their ability to fight and move at night. Clearly, they will need skilled leaders and special training to bring them to these high standards. To help reach these standards rapidly, three new light infantry battalions will be built using the battalion COHORT system.

At the heart of our efforts to make the new light battalion succeed will be effective, demanding small-unit training. Toward this end, the Infantry School, along with its continuing emphasis on heavy infantry, has developed a training program to support the conversion of the 7th Infantry Division and the activation of a new division yet to be formed. The major elements of the program revolve around improving the light infantry skills of the soldiers during their One-Station Unit Training

(OSUT); conducting special training at Fort Benning for complete sets of unit leaders so that they can conduct better squad and platoon training once they return to their units; and infusing Ranger-trained leaders into the divisions. (The key leaders of a battalion, for example, will be Ranger-trained; all infantry platoons will have some Ranger-qualified personnel assigned to them.)

The courses in this training program are the following:

**The Light Leader Course.** This four-week course, conducted by the Ranger School, is a "train the trainer" course for all infantry unit leaders. Battalion sets of unit leaders, from company commander to team leader, will be trained at one time.

**The Light Fighter Course.** This course, focused on squad and platoon training, is conducted in four weeks by the division for infantry companies and in one week for non-combat units.

**The Light Infantry OSUT COHORT.** This special OSUT course for light infantry COHORT units is proposed to be 15 weeks long. The course will be evaluated during Fiscal Year 1985 using a COHORT battalion from the 7th Infantry Division. If it proves worthwhile, future COHORT battalions will undergo this training.

**The Ranger School.** Now nine weeks long, it will train Rangers as it always has. The priority of allocations will be given to soldiers assigned to Ranger battalions and light infantry units, and to infantry lieutenants. Ranger School will be expanded, as needed, to support the total needs of the Army as the light infantry training requirements increase.

This training program is an essential part of the Army's desire to build a high-quality light infantry force quickly. During Fiscal Years 1985 and 1986, the results of this intensive training effort will be closely monitored and evaluated. The Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) will conduct an external evaluation of the organizational concept as well as the performance of the light infantry division. The key points everyone will be watching for are how well the units can meet the new and rigorous standards and how well the new training concept supports the transition to light infantry units.

This brief overview cannot capture the entire light infantry effort. But the main thrust of the effort is quite clear — to build highly proficient units made up of leaders and soldiers who are physically and mentally tough, units that are oriented toward low- to mid-intensity conflicts, and units that have the capability to go anywhere and win.

# INFANTRY NEWS



THE INFANTRY SCHOOL is presently reviewing and revising Field Manual 23-90, 81mm Mortar.

Users who have suggestions for the revision should send them on a DA Form 2028 to the Commandant, United States Army Infantry School, ATTN: ATSH-W-MO, Fort Benning, GA 31905-5598.

THE COMMANDER OF THE U.S. Army Garrison at Fort Chaffee, Arkansas, has told us of a recent publication entitled *A Guide to Training Opportunities*. It lists the ranges, firing points, observation posts, and other training and administrative facilities that are available for use by units desiring to train at Fort Chaffee. The post is located in northwest Arkansas on the Arkansas River just off Interstate 40 near the Oklahoma border. It has more than 70,000 acres of land and enough barracks and other facilities to meet the training needs of more than 30 battalions.

With its wide variety of terrain, Fort Chaffee can provide a challenging and realistic training environment for almost any kind of military unit. A tactical, sod C-130 strip and two drop zones, for instance, are available for units that want to conduct early deployment readiness at the post. Three prepared bridge training sites are also available for river crossing operations.

Anyone who would like more information on what Fort Chaffee has to offer as a training site should send for a copy of the training guide. Write to Headquarters, U.S. Army Garrison, ATTN: ATZR-Z-OPS, Fort Chaffee, Arkansas 72905, or call AUTOVON 962-2206/2466, commercial 501-484-2206/2466.

THE PUSHUP is the one event on

the Army Physical Readiness Test (APRT) that resident students at the Infantry School fail most often. During the past year, as many as 41 students out of a class of 175 have failed the diagnostic test. All 41 of them failed the pushup event; only a few of them also failed either the run or the situp. This failure rate is of concern because of the general age group of the students, 27 to 30, and the fact that they are the Infantry leaders who are supposed to maintain the standards of the Army back in their units.

There are two primary reasons for a student's failure to pass the pushup event. The most obvious is weak upper body strength; the other is faulty technique in performing the pushup. For most of the students who fail the event, their upper body is temporarily weak either because of a recent injury or because they have not conducted regular strength-building exercises. Generally, these students, by participating in a remedial physical training program, can develop their upper body strength and pass their final APRT. There are some, though, who fail the final test and do not graduate with their classmates.

It is important, when designing a remedial PT program, to work on the specific weakness each soldier has displayed. Too often a commander, in response to failures, will run all his men hard during remedial PT when their upper body strength is the real problem.

It is also important for a commander to use some of his most "PT knowledgeable" personnel to operate his remedial PT program — not an NCO or an officer who needs more PT himself. If such a program is not properly supervised, it can actually destroy what the commander is trying to build.

But upper body strength is not the only problem. Sometimes soldiers with

exceptional muscle development in their upper bodies fail because they cannot do pushups properly. The greatest challenge when performing the pushup is to form a level plane from elbow to elbow across the back when in the "down" position. Many soldiers go only part of the way down or give "head fakes" toward the ground and think they are meeting the standard. Many also fail to lock their elbows in the "up" position. One good way to improve on technique is to have the soldiers face each other in PT formation and while one rank of soldiers performs the pushups, the other rank from a kneeling position observes and evaluates them. The important thing here is to stress the proper pushup technique.

Another way to improve on both strength and technique is to have soldiers perform many small sets (five to seven) of the four-count pushup during their conditioning drills. These small sets, with other exercises interspersed, provide for a slight recovery of strength and allow the soldiers to concentrate on technique and not solely on surviving the exercise. Then, at the end of the conditioning drills or the follow-on run, the soldiers should be required to do a large number of pushups to provide for the "overload" of those muscles and to develop strength and endurance.

There are other ways to improve on upper body strength, of course. Weights and exercise machines are excellent for this purpose, and a properly planned and supervised program should improve the overall conditioning of a unit as well.

Why all this concern about the APRT? To the soldier, it is very important. Failing the APRT will prevent his reenlistment, deny him schooling opportunities, or cause him to fail courses he does attend. Commanders and



supervisors must therefore ensure that training for the APRT is done to the proper standard, even though soldiers may complain, in order to protect those same soldiers in the future. (*This item was prepared by Lieutenant Colonel Lawrence B. Goodwin, Jr., Commander, 1st Battalion, The School Brigade, U.S. Army Infantry School.*)

THE FOLLOWING NEWS ITEMS were received from the Infantry School's Directorate of Training and Doctrine:

- **Job Books.** The Job Books for CMF 11 were developed to support the commander's evaluation portion of the Army's Individual Training Evaluation Program (ITEP).

They were designed to be used by the NCO supervisor/trainer to record a soldier's demonstrated proficiency based on standardized training objectives contained in the Soldier's Manual for Skill Level 1 and 2 soldiers. They were also designed to be used as vehicles for transferring training information from unit to unit. Thus, when a unit receives a new soldier, a starting point for individual training can be established.

An up-to-date job book is an effective training management tool because it helps the trainer identify the tasks on which soldiers need additional training. By using this information, a commander and his trainers can plan effective individual training programs.

Army Regulation 350-1 and TRADOC 351-11 state that the job books are "not subject to administrative inspection or audit except by the unit chain of command."

- **SQT Program.** The SQT program can have a significant effect on an enlisted soldier's military career. Scoring well on the SQT is, in fact, vital to his career progression. The SQT is a written test and is based solely on tasks contained in the CMF 11 Soldier's Manuals.

As part of the SQT development effort, the Infantry School has been conducting field validations in units in the United States and in overseas locations of the CMF 11 SQT for Fiscal Year 1985. A major concern of many of the

soldiers is the apparent lack of individual training on Soldier's Manual tasks at the unit level. The soldiers say that very little individual preparation is being done, especially for those soldiers in the lower five enlisted grades.

Units must ensure that individual training is conducted on Soldier's Manual tasks, especially on those mentioned in the annual SQT notice. Units should also develop programs to encourage individual preparation. If they do not do these things, their soldiers' military careers could be jeopardized. Individual training must be accomplished not only to ensure that soldiers do well on the SQT but also to see that their individual skills are maintained and sustained within a unit.

THE NATIONAL INFANTRY MUSEUM has furnished us these items of interest:

The Fourth Annual National Infantry Museum Five-Mile Run has been scheduled for Saturday, 13 October 1984. Participation has increased each year, and there were more than 3,000 runners in last year's event.

Runners from other posts are invited to take part, and awards will be given in the individual, team, and formation categories. Further information may be obtained from the National Infantry Museum, Fort Benning, Georgia 31905, AUTOVON 835-2958, or commercial 404/545-2958.

The Museum recently added to its growing Italian collection a complete Italian enlisted infantryman's uniform from World War II. In addition, an Italian general from World War II days, Giuseppe Festa, donated the Sam Brown belt from his uniform, which was already on display.

A horse-drawn, wooden supply cart used in World War I by the medical corps has also been acquired and will be placed on display when some restoration work has been done on it.

The Museum prepared a special exhibit in honor of Lieutenant General David E. Grange's retirement at Fort Benning. General Grange, a former Infantry School commandant, made the trip from Ranger headquarters to

the retirement ceremony in the Museum's World War II command car.

Some other recent donations to the Museum include a camouflage parachute used in the jump on Corregidor on 16 February 1945 by Charles E. Breit; a Civil War sponge cover; a Spanish-American war mess kit and a cap device (Company K, 8th Infantry) for an M1895 forage cap; a rare Fascist Italian officer's dagger, and a German SA dagger; memorabilia of Sergeant Harold W. Hankins, an original member of Darby's Rangers during World War II; and the uniform worn by PFC John C. Reich, the first man to jump from his aircraft during Operation URGENT FURY and to land on the island of Grenada. PFC Reich is a radio operator with the 1st Battalion, 75th Infantry (Rangers).

The National Infantry Museum Society, formed at Fort Benning a number of years ago to assist the Museum with financial and volunteer support, is open to anyone who is interested in joining. The cost is \$2.00 for a one-year membership, or \$10.00 for a lifetime membership.

Additional information about the Museum and Society is available from the Director, National Infantry Museum, Fort Benning, GA 31905, AUTOVON 835-2958, or commercial 404/545-2958.

THE FOLLOWING NEWS ITEMS were submitted by the U.S. Army Infantry Board:

- **High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) Weapon Station-40mm (Grenade) Machinegun, MK 19 Mod 3 (MK 19).** Several service schools have recognized the need to have a weapon station on the new HMMWV for mounting selected weapon systems and other devices. The Infantry School wanted a weapon station for mounting a variety of automatic weapons; the Military Police School wanted to mount an MK 19 for rear area combat operations; and the Field Artillery School saw a need for employing the Ground/Vehicular Laser Locator-Designator (G/VLLD) from the gun station on the HMMWV.

To save money, the Army decided to test the three recognized needs simultaneously, and the Infantry Board conducted the joint test during November and December 1983 and January 1984.

The HMMWV weapon station tested consists of a 36-inch diameter ring mount with the necessary adapters to accommodate the MK 64 MOD 4 gun cradle and the G/VLLD, AN/TVQ-2. The MK MOD 4 gun cradle serves as a tri-weapon mount for the MK 19, M2, and M60 machineguns with their attached ammunition boxes.

The 40mm (grenade) machinegun, MK 19 MOD 3, is a belt fed, air cooled, blowback operated, advanced primer ignition weapon. It fires 325 to 375 rounds per minute from the open-bolt position in either a semi-automatic or an automatic mode, and it has iron sights that are graduated from 100 to 1,500 meters. It weighs 72.5 pounds and is 43.10 inches long. The MK 19 can also be ground mounted on the M3 tripod.

The Infantry Board tested the HMMWV weapon station and the MK 19 at Fort Benning; the Field Artillery School tested the G/VLLD at Redstone Arsenal. The purpose of the tests was to determine hit probability; human factors and safety implications; reliability and maintainability; adequacy of training programs; and position-disclosing effects.

The data obtained from this test, along with data from other sources, will be used to determine the adequacy of the weapon station on the HMMWV and to evaluate the operational capability of the MK 19.

• **Surrogate Fast Attack Vehicle.** Recent studies again have emphasized the need for reconnaissance or command and control vehicles in an infantry division. The Infantry Board recently evaluated a surrogate fast attack vehicle (SFAV) to see if a vehicle of this type would meet the requirements.

The SFAV is a two-passenger wheeled vehicle made with a high-strength tubular frame and a unitized roll cage. Its power train is a 90-horsepower, air-cooled, gasoline engine and a standard four-speed manual trans-



Surrogate Fast Attack Vehicle

axle with rear drive that provides high cross-country speed and mobility. Numerous modifications have been applied to include hardening the welded seams; installing a 24-volt electrical system; adding weapon mounts (TOW and universal) and fenders; and strengthening the drive wheels.

During the test, the test soldiers used the SFAV to accomplish route reconnaissances, zone reconnaissances, and night observation post missions. Equipment essential to each mission

was loaded on the vehicle to see what effect it would have on the vehicle's operational capabilities. The roads and trails varied on each mission; they included improved hard-surfaced roads, improved gravel roads, and unimproved dirt trails over heavily vegetated and rolling hills.

The Infantry School will use the test results to determine whether a vehicle of this type would meet an Infantry Division's need for a reconnaissance or command and control vehicle.

• **Airdrop Rigging Procedures for the Squad Automatic Weapon.** Tests on the squad automatic weapon (SAW), which is scheduled to be fielded during Fiscal Years 1985 and 1986, did not include the validation of airdrop rigging procedures for the parachutist to use when jumping with the SAW and its ammunition. These tests clearly needed to be done. The Infantry School therefore developed certain proposed rigging procedures, and the Infantry Board conducted airdrop operations to test these procedures. During the test, parachutists performed jumps while wearing typical combat equipment, including the SAW

and its ammunition, rigged according to the proposed procedures.

The Board modified a parachutist's standard adjustable individual weapons case (M1950) to accommodate the SAW. (This case is secured vertically by a quick-release snap attached to the left D-ring on the parachute harness.) Before each jump, the parachutists rigged their SAWs and ammunition loads according to the proposed procedures. During their descent, they lowered the case on its lowering line. Then, after landing, they derigged and placed their SAWs in operation.

All of these were timed exercises.



The SAW systems were inspected before they were put in operation and, if no damage was apparent, they were fired to determine functioning and the retention of zero.

Data was collected on the ability of the test soldiers to rig their SAWs for airdrop according to the proposed procedures; any personnel injuries or damage to the SAW and its ammunition during the airdrop operations; the human factors of the rigging procedures; and any safety hazards noted.

The test results will be used by the decision authorities to prepare and publish Army-wide procedures for SAW airdrop rigging.

• **Extended Cold/Wet Clothing System and Formal Sleeping System.** The joint working group that is responsible for the Integrated Individual Fighting System Program (IIFSP) continues to search for better clothing and equipment for the Army's soldiers. The program's objectives are to reduce the weight of the soldier's load while providing him with better environmental protection over a wide spectrum of climatic conditions, to evaluate it as quickly and efficiently as possible, and to recommend particular items for procurement.

The latest clothing system to be evaluated by the Board is designed to provide environmental protection in temperatures ranging between 40 degrees and minus 25 degrees Fahrenheit when the ambient relative humidity tends toward saturation. This system is supposed to be substantially lighter than the current cold/wet ensemble, and it should give the soldier increased environmental protection.

At the same time, three sleeping systems were considered. All of these were designed to make a soldier's sleep more comfortable and restful under the same climatic conditions. Each was lighter than the current sleeping bag with cover and foam pad and was said to provide increased protection.

The Board conducted its tests at Camp Ethan Allen, Vermont, where the temperatures varied from a high of 41 degrees F. to a low of minus 23 degrees F. The test soldiers were members of two infantry platoons — one a

30-man Army platoon and the other a 28-man Marine Corps platoon. A five-week winter warfare training program served as the scenario for the test.

Each test soldier used the clothing ensemble and alternated using the sleeping systems while taking part in the training program. Test observers collected data pertaining to functional performance, compatibility, durability, maintainability, human factors, and safety.

The data obtained will be used by the Infantry School and by the Marine Corps Development and Education Command in making decisions concerning the future development of cold/wet clothing systems and formal sleeping wear.

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THE FOLLOWING NEWS ITEMS were submitted by the Infantry School's Directorate of Combat Developments:

• **Rifle Company TOEs.** The Infantry School is currently reviewing a number of rifle company TOEs to determine how mortars can again be made a part of a company's firepower assets. The infantry community feels that a second level of mortars — at company level — is essential in light of the Army's current and evolving doctrine.

The rifle company of the light infantry battalion, which has a total strength of 124 soldiers, is now being looked at, and several ways of adding a mortar section to the company's TOE are being analyzed. At the moment, the leading proposal would have two 60mm mortars (lightweight company mortar system) and six soldiers organized into two three-man squads. One of the squad leaders would also serve as the section leader. Because of end strength constraints, however, and the need to maintain the light division's current deployability profile, some personnel trade-offs will have to be made to get those six spaces.

The present company structure has six two-man Dragon teams organized as a separate antiarmor section under its own section leader. It might be possible to reduce the number of

Dragon teams to three, which would free the six spaces needed for the mortar section. Or it might be possible to reduce the number of M60 machinegun teams in each rifle platoon headquarters from two to one. These six spaces could then be used to form a mortar section.

There is an inherent risk in each case of trading off one capability for another; each possibility must be weighed in terms of mission essential operational capability.

• **Black Combat Boot.** The Army has adopted a new black combat boot that offers greater comfort and support than the current boot does. The decision to adopt the new boot was the result of a recommendation from the Infantry School, and this recommendation was based on the results of a combined combat boot walk-off test. The test was conducted at Fort Benning, at the San Diego Marine Corps Base, and at the Human Engineering Laboratories at Aberdeen Proving Ground, but soldiers from several other sites also wore the boots and provided data. (Six boots, all from U.S. manufacturers, were evaluated.)

The new boot has a speed lace system and, compared to the present boot, offers improved durability, increased resistance to water, and improved traction.

A date of issue is yet to be determined.

• **Long Range Surveillance Unit.** For the first time since the Vietnam era, the U.S. Army will soon have a long range operational and tactical reconnaissance capability in each division and corps.

Beginning in Fiscal Year 1986, the Army will field and train a company for each corps and a small detachment for each division. The key building blocks of this organization will be six-man patrol teams designed to operate in a passive mode 15 to 150 kilometers behind enemy lines.

The operational concept has been approved by TRADOC, and a draft TOE is awaiting final review. A formal training program is being jointly developed by the Infantry School and the Special Warfare Center. All com-



manders, operations personnel, and patrol members assigned to these units will be required to take this training.

• **Force Structuring.** The Directorate is applying Army of Excellence (AOE) force structuring guidelines to all active infantry forces. The end result will be a much more streamlined Army than that first envisioned in the Division 86 studies.

The goal of AOE is to restructure the active forces within Congressionally imposed manpower ceilings. The restructuring is being applied to all units, from the squad to the echelons above corps. The light infantry division, for example, is an AOE organization.

AOE structuring either has been or will soon be applied to all active TOEs, and structural changes to units will be apparent by FY 1986 as the new TOEs are approved.

The AOE guidelines are to use real world manpower austerity; dispense with "sacred cows"; determine what missions can best be done and at what level; achieve a total active force within the Army's 780,000 manpower ceiling.

• **The Soldier's Load.** Numerous studies have been made, by the Infantry School and by other military organizations, dealing with the problem of the individual fighting man's combat load. This problem has existed since man first organized armies, but today it has been complicated considerably by the devices and equipment the fighting man needs to survive on the modern battlefield.

In January 1982 Headquarters TRADOC formed a joint working group (JWG) to oversee its integrated individual fighting system program (IIFSP). The Infantry School presently chairs the JWG. The program's objectives are to increase the soldier's ability to accomplish his mission and his survivability and sustainability; to lessen his stress and encumbrance; to give him at least 72 hours of environmental protection; to provide a system

in which the combined weight of the fighting, mission, and existence loads does not exceed 72 pounds; and to reduce the development-to-fielding time by capitalizing on the commercial marketplace.

The IIFSP considers the soldier's load from a total systems viewpoint. The breakdown of the load follows the breakdown of the fighting, existence, and mission loads as discussed in Field Manual 21-15. Studies conducted by the Human Engineering Laboratory have indicated that the average Infantryman's loads in a temperate climate are:

<b>FIGHTING LOAD</b>	<b>62.3 pounds</b>
<b>EXISTENCE LOAD</b>	<b>49.3 pounds</b>
<b>MISSION LOAD</b>	<b>6.6 pounds</b>
(average)	
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>118.2 pounds</b>

The HEL studies have also shown that the ideal weight for a soldier's load should be no more than 30% of his body weight, and that his heaviest load should not exceed 45% of his body weight. For the 50th percentile soldier (160 pounds), these figures amount to 48 pounds and 72 pounds respectively.

The fighting load represents the clothing and individual equipment — from the skin out — that the infantryman carries into combat. Its components include the rifle with a basic load of ammunition; individual clothing items plus the chemical protective overgarment ensemble; the PASGT vest and helmet; and the load-bearing equipment with the attached individual equipment. It is not expected that any sizable reductions can be made in the weight of the soldier's fighting load, but the IIFSP does hope to improve the positioning of the load and the compatibility of its components. For example, a requirements document for a load-bearing vest has been forwarded to the materiel developer, and a vest should be fielded within the next two years as a replacement for the current

load-bearing equipment.

The existence load contains items that are not needed for immediate combat but that are necessary to sustain and protect the soldier for the duration of missions lasting 72 hours or longer. The components include the ALICE pack with frame; shelter half; sleeping bag; rations; and additional clothing and necessary personal items. Significant reductions in the existence load are now being considered. Space age fabrics and the layering principle are key elements in reducing the weight of the existence load, along with such items as the individual multipurpose shelter, which is expected to replace the shelter half and poncho in two years or less.

The mission load varies considerably according to a soldier's mission, a unit's SOP, and a commander's preferences. It consists mainly of unit equipment and weapons such as radios, AT weapons, and claymore mines. Unit leaders, of course, influence the mission load weight that the soldiers must carry, and often have to make trade-offs in the existence load and the fighting load to keep the total load to a tolerable weight. In the mission load, the aim of the IIFSP is to ensure that existing and developmental items are compatible with the load-bearing equipment. One such example is the new SINCGARS radio, which a soldier will be able to carry with both the developmental load-bearing vest and the present ALICE.

The U.S. Army Infantry School has combat development proponentcy for hundreds of items of clothing and individual equipment. The IIFSP JWG, which meets at least twice a year, provides the necessary forum and the necessary cooperation between the user community, the combat developer, and the materiel developer so that all three can articulate their needs and move steadfastly toward reducing the soldier's load.





## RC Exchange Program

CAPTAIN GEORGE B. HUFF, JR.

The United States Army has long participated in exchanges of individual Active Army personnel with other nations to foster professional military relationships between nations. Today, it has more than 100 exchange programs with 18 other countries. Although international personnel exchanges of individual Reserve Component soldiers have not developed on the same routine basis, there is certainly a similar need for them. The mobilization and deployment of soldiers of the National Guard and the U.S. Army Reserve will necessitate the same professional military relationships that the Active Army personnel exchanges are designed to achieve.

Last year, as commander of a U.S. Army Reserve training company, I recommended that an exchange of officers take place between the U.S. Army Reserve and its counterpart in Great Britain, the British Territorial Army, to test the concept. As a result, with the help of Lieutenant Colonel Robin Drummond, the British Liaison Officer to the U.S. Army Infantry School at Fort Benning, I had the pleasure of attending Annual Camp 1983 with the 5th (Volunteer) Battalion, The Royal Anglian Regiment.

The Royal Anglian Regiment is one of three regiments of The Queen's Division, which is one of six divisions in the British Army. The others are

the Guards, King's, Scottish, Prince of Wales', and Light Divisions. Together they contain all the old regiments of the line that have served the British Army and the United Kingdom so well for so many centuries.

These divisions and regiments, like those in our own regimental system, are administrative, not tactical, groupings and should not be confused with the infantry and armored divisions of the Field Army. The regiments now include both Regular and Territorial Army (TA) Infantry Battalions, and the TA is an integral part of the Army's structure. Its manpower and units, in fact, form a large part of the Army's fighting strength.

The main strength of the modern TA lies within its Infantry battalions, but it also has other units ranging from gunner and engineer formations to armored reconnaissance regiments. In addition to the major units, there are also minor units that vary from mapmaking squadrons to specialist signal units. There are even TA SAS units and battalions of TA parachute troops.

These units are made up mainly of part-time soldiers drawn from all walks of civilian life, and their equipment, in most cases, is exactly the same as that of the front line units. For territorial units, however, the accent is on wheeled rather than tracked vehicles. This has the attraction of

lower costs coupled with less demanding maintenance and training requirements. Thus, an Infantry support weapons company would carry its 81mm mortars in Land Rovers rather than in FV 432s, which are comparable to U.S. M113s.

Each member of the TA has to attend about 30 training days a year, of which 15 are at a training camp or establishment on a full-time basis. (Many TA members put in extra hours as well and in return are paid by a system of Regular pay scale rates and tax exempt bounties.) The minimum period of enlistment is three years.

The general standard of training is very high for the simple reason that the members are all volunteers who have joined only because they wanted to. The training is often hard; some weekend training sessions take place in the field under all kinds of conditions. TA soldiers often have to leave work on a Friday evening, travel straight to their training areas, and commence their training exercises immediately. To make the best possible use of the limited time available, the exercises often continue throughout the weekend without a break, and when the soldiers return to work on Monday morning, they often have had little rest.

The annual training camp is a full-time affair, and in many cases it takes



place in locations other than the United Kingdom. Units often travel to West Germany, and a small number of TA soldiers have even made journeys to the United States, Canada, Gibraltar, Cyprus, and other European countries.

The Royal Anglian Regiment became a regiment of infantry in 1964 as a result of a series of reorganizations and amalgamations of former county regiments that had been raised between 1685 and 1759. The regiment is an administrative grouping of three Regular Army infantry battalions and three Territorial Army infantry battalions. The Regiment's recruiting area is limited to East Anglia, a nine-county area made up of Lincolnshire, Norfolk, Suffolk, Essex, Hertfordshire, Bedfordshire, Cambridgeshire, Leicestershire, and Northamptonshire.

The Regular battalions are presently stationed just outside the university town of Cambridge (1st Battalion); in the ancient garrison town of Colchester (2d Battalion); and in Germany (3d Battalion, which is a mechanized battalion of the 1st British Corps). In the past two years, the 1st and 3d Battalions have carried out operational tours in Belize in Central America.

The Territorial Army battalions of the Royal Anglian Regiment are situated in East Anglia with their headquarters in Peterborough (No. 5), Bury St. Edmunds (No. 6), and Leicester (No. 7). The 5th (V) Battalion and the 7th (V) Battalion, both wheeled infantry, have NATO roles, while the 6th (V) Battalion has a home defense role.

The 5th Battalion, to which I was attached on my visit, consists of a headquarters and headquarters company at Peterborough and four rifle companies — at Ipswich, Wellingborough, Chelmsford, and Hertford. In addition, five detachments of the battalion maintain separate drill halls in other locations for their platoons. The battalion headquarters and headquarters company is separated from the four rifle companies by distances of from 35 to 90 miles. The strength of the battalion is approximately 700 men.



Range firing with individual weapons (SLRs).

For its 1983 annual camp, the 5th Battalion concentrated at Prince Maurice Barracks, Devizes, Wiltshire from 3-17 September 1983, for training in the Salisbury Plains Training Area. The camp was staged to prepare the battalion for its NATO role exercises in West Germany in 1984. As a Territorial Army infantry battalion, the 5th is a part of the 49th Infantry Brigade, a TA brigade assigned for mobilization to the rear area defense of the 1st British Corps in the British Army of the Rhine (BAOR). Present were 324 officers and men. The rest had completed or would complete their annual training requirements by alternative or concurrent training at other sites.

The battalion training program was carefully planned, closely followed, and aggressively executed. Battalion officers met daily for afternoon conferences with the Battalion Training Major, who provided prompt support and training assistance.

The first week of the camp was devoted to battalion training "cadres," which actually are training courses for recruits, potential NCOs, radio users, machinegun operators, and drivers, and the second week to company and battalion field training exercises.

The 49th Infantry Brigade operated separate training cadres for Milan

(MAW) gunners, radio users, machinegun operators, and assault pioneers (combat engineers) to which soldiers of the subordinate infantry units were attached for training and administration. In addition to these activities, the 5th Battalion scheduled a march and shoot competition and fitness test and participated in the rugged Cambrian March Patrol Competition.

The march and shoot competition, held on the morning of the first training day, was a company-level tactical forced march to a live fire range. The four rifle companies were scored on an inspection of individual equipment, on their bogey march times to the live fire range, and on the number of hits on targets at 250 meters with individual rifles and machineguns. The competition established a momentum that was maintained by the battalion leaders throughout the annual camp. In the afternoon of that first day, with spirits high, the battalion training cadres began. My own schedule included participating in the battalion and brigade training cadres during the first week.

The 5th Battalion's recruit cadre picked up their recruit training where it had left off in the drill halls back home. The tasks required of the recruits at the camp were equivalent to the U.S. Army's 11B MOS tasks at Skill Levels 1 through 3.

(The first-term infantry soldier in the Territorial Army is ordinarily trained by a Regular Army drill sergeant during annual camp in a recruit cadre conducted by the battalion with which he enlisted, while the Regular first-term infantry soldier is trained at a division depot. Each division operates its own depot, and first-term infantry training may vary accordingly between regiments. A TA recruit may also attend a Regular training cadre at a division depot, but most are unable to be away from their civilian employment long enough to do this. Although there is not a British statute that protects a TA recruit from employment discrimination during an extended absence for military duty, most employers encourage their men to participate in TA training.)

The cadre for potential NCOs at the camp was designed to train selected private soldiers of limited experience to become effective Lance Corporals. The two-week course was tightly controlled using 12-hour training days, progressive physical conditioning, live fire ranges, and battle drills. The program of instruction was the equivalent of an 11B military occupational specialty (MOS) course including tasks at Skill Levels 1 through 5.

This cadre began with a timed three-mile physical fitness run in combat boots over a marked road course. The test, an annual requirement, is very similar to the running requirement in our Army Physical Readiness Test (APRT) in that the qualifying times are scaled according to a soldier's age. There was much competition among all the ranks for good scores, and the soldiers of the 5th Battalion scored excellent times. The remainder of the cadre day was devoted to close-order drill and ceremonies, methods of instruction, individual weapon training, and map reading.

The entire cadre was supervised by a Regular Army WO2, or drill sergeant. The results were remarkable. At the end of the cadre the students, including a TA officer candidate, were physically and mentally tough-

ened, were confident of their infantry skills, and had developed a noticeable enthusiasm. The battalion commander recognized individual excellence by presenting appropriate awards.

The aim of the radio-user cadre was to qualify the soldiers in radio/telephone procedures. The cadre began with classroom instruction on the message format and on sending and receiving. Later, the soldiers used the buddy team system for the field training of the radio users.

As mentioned earlier, the battalion also sent soldiers to an assault pioneer cadre operated by the 49th Infantry Brigade. Assault pioneer sections, similar to our combat engineers, are responsible for laying and clearing minefields and for the use of demolitions. The instruction I observed consisted of the clearing of a friendly minefield using electric mine detectors. A Regular Army sergeant also delivered a class and a practical exercise on the emplacement and removal of antipersonnel and antivehicular mines.

## TRAINING EVENTS

During the second week of the camp, the 5th Battalion staged company and battalion field training exercises. The commander of the No. 4 rifle company, to which I was assigned, prepared a map and aerial video-tape reconnaissance of the ground and presented a detailed operations order using the video-tape of the routes. The company's mission was to establish patrol and listening posts during daylight and darkness, and the video-tape technique was an interesting one. The execution of the company's mission included airborne movement by RAF Puma helicopters.

The combat patrols were led very much like United States Army light infantry patrols are, the principal difference being in equipment and terminology. A patrol leader controlled two team leaders with hand signals and voice commands; the team

leaders reacted aggressively and led their men by example. For tactical references, a patrol leader relied on the *Aide Memoire*, a pocket manual similar in content to a Ranger Handbook.

The battalion field training exercises were a two-day operation with the 7th Battalion. The 5th Battalion acted as the enemy force for the 7th, which was being evaluated for combat readiness on its annual report. The exercise, which did not include NBC clothing, was made up of defensive and attack operations, patrols, and listening posts. Umpires watched the events closely and awarded casualties and prisoners of war.

Support units provided troop-carrying and reconnaissance helicopters and a radio net. I accompanied a movement to contact and an assault in which the effective use of pyrotechnic devices, smoke screens, radio communication, and aggressive soldiers produced a coordinated battalion effort.

The Cambrian March Patrol Competition, an annual event that attracts the keen interest of Regular, Territorial Army, and other British and Allied units, was considered the climax or the final test exercise of a soldier's or a squad's annual training. The purpose of the competition was to test foot patrols of nine men in long movements over the rugged, mountainous terrain near Sennybridge Training Camp at Brecon, Wales. The competition was aimed at giving the fit, well-trained, and well-led soldier a chance to compare his standards against those of similar units. A patrol from the 5th Battalion completed this challenging event.

In addition to observing the training of the 5th Battalion, I also visited two Regular Army installations. These visits were particularly interesting to me because of my position as an infantry training company commander. The first visit, to the School of Infantry based at Warminster, included an afternoon stop at the Support Weapons Wing situated at nearby Netheravon.

The second visit was to the Queen's



Division Depot at Bassingbourn, which is an old RAF station in East Anglia. The Depot provides first term infantry training for Regular Army recruits of the Division's three regiments — The Queen's Regiment, The Royal Regiment of Fusiliers, and The Royal Anglian Regiment.

The training cycle at Bassingbourn is 18 weeks in length, and there potential infantrymen learn about the history and tradition of their regiments and are awarded their cap badges. The program of instruction is somewhat similar to that given at the United States Army Infantry Center at Fort Benning, but it also includes swimming, football, basketball, and other team sports. The Regular Army recruit cadres consist of between 35 and 40 soldiers per cycle, and the rate of attrition is ordinarily near 30 percent.

As a follow-up to my visit in late

1983, Major N.H. Kelsey of the 5th Battalion, visited the Army Training Center at Fort Benning. Since then, 18 other exchange officer slots have been identified.

A continuing program of routine individual personnel exchanges between the Reserve Components of the United States Army and their counterparts in other countries could do much to foster professional military relationships among the participating armies. The cost would not be significant because the exchanges could be accomplished in lieu of the members' annual camps with their own organizations. Existing military air transportation could be made available for exchange personnel.

The benefits of such a program to the participants and their units as well would be significant — both personally and professionally. Their exposure to new approaches to training,

doctrine, and techniques could do much to stimulate their professional growth. And the exposure to officers and soldiers of another country would develop relationships between the countries on a personal level. Finally, the exchange of part-time soldiers who could also share their civilian life experiences would be a natural way to demonstrate a commitment to peace through strength and mutual support in the Free World.



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## The BTR: Ivan's Other Carrier

**CAPTAIN SCOTT R. GOURLEY**

The BMP, the Soviet's tracked infantry fighting vehicle — in its various versions — has received considerable attention in the West since its introduction in 1967. [See "Evolution of the BMP," by CPT David F. McDermott and CPT Scott R. Gourley, *INFANTRY*, November-December 1983, pages 19-22.] Meanwhile, the BTR, Ivan's "other" carrier, has been too often neglected or overlooked. Yet the BTR — *Brone-transporter* (literally "armored transporter") — has been an integral part of the Soviet Army since the end of World War II. United States forces have encountered the BTR all over the globe and probably will continue

to do so. (Most recently, for example, some of the first threat equipment photos out of Grenada showed two BTR-60s that had been neutralized by U.S. firepower.)

The Soviets have introduced several major families of infantry BTRs during the past 40 years — BTR-152, BTR-40, BTR-50, BTR-60, and BTR-70 — each with several major variations.

The first Soviet-built armored personnel carrier (aside from the BA-64 wheeled scout car) was the BTR-152. Although prototype development on this vehicle began immediately after World War II, it was not seriously introduced until 1950. With some

resemblance to a wheeled version of the U.S. Army's M3 half-track and (in its armor layout) to a World War II German half-track, the original BTR-152s were based on the ZIL-151 truck chassis. The truck's rear dual tires had been replaced by larger single tires, and the vehicle was powered by a 110-horsepower 6-cylinder ZIL-123 gasoline engine. The normal armament for the vehicle was a 7.62mm machinegun, but some versions were known to mount either a 12.7mm or a 14.5mm weapon. The BTR-152 could carry a crew of two and up to 17 passengers; it was not amphibious.

The Soviets, seeking to improve

some of the operating characteristics of the BTR-152, later introduced three "V" models. The primary improvement in each of these models was the addition of a tire inflation-deflation system. The BTR-152V1 was still based on the ZIL-151 truck chassis but had external air lines for tire pressure regulation. Both the V2 and the V3 models, based on the ZIL-157 truck chassis, had internal air lines, but the V2 did not have a vehicle winch while the V3 had both a winch and infrared driving lights.

The BTR-152K was the next improvement in the 152 family. (The "K" designator indicates that overhead armor was added to the vehicle.) It is apparently this vehicle that Viktor Suvorov (a Soviet defector writing under a pen name) refers to as "a simple lorry with armor plating fixed on top."


Suvorov, a former BTR unit commander, says:

*The BTR-152 was a copy of that splendid American lorry, the Studebaker. The copy, as distinct from the original, was not a success and, after another five tons of armor had been added, it looked like anything else on earth but a battle machine.* (Obviously, this is a British translation of Suvorov's comments.)

The final member of the 152 family was the "U" version, an armored command vehicle. It was a V1 or V3 model with a tall metal shelter built onto its rear, making it 8.9 feet tall, compared to 6.5 feet for the other models.

The second Soviet BTR family was the BTR-40. While some references claim it was introduced as early as 1946, most sources agree that it entered production in 1951.

Based on a GAZ-63 (4 x 4) truck chassis (but with an even shorter wheelbase), the BTR-40 family had three variants in addition to the basic vehicle. The BTR-40A was an anti-aircraft version that mounted twin 14.5mm heavy machineguns. The BTR-40K had four armored roof hatches for limited protection. The third variant, the BTR-40P (also known as the BRDM), was am-



BTR-60 PB

phibious and had overhead armor. The main wheels had a tire inflation-deflation device and two sets of additional wheels under the belly of the vehicle, which could be raised or lowered to help prevent "bellying." Although it was referred to as an armored personnel carrier, the BTR-40 was employed primarily as a reconnaissance vehicle.

The only tracked member of the BTR series, the BTR-50, was first seen in 1957. Perhaps it is because of its tracks that the BTR-50 is the only one Suvorov praises. He calls it a "splendid machine" and laments the fact that his unit could not get them.

Based on a PT-76 amphibious tank chassis, the basic model was the BTR-50P (amphibious). This open-top model was supplemented by the BTR-50PK. These vehicles carried a crew of two and 12 passengers. Their normal armament was a 7.62mm machinegun. Hatches in the armored roof permitted the soldiers inside to get out over the sides of the vehicle. The third member of the "-50 family" to be introduced was the BTR-50PU, a command version built on the chassis of the BTR-50P.

The BTR-50 (still around, of

course, as are some members of the earlier families in one army or another) is powered by a 6-cylinder diesel engine which produces 240-horsepower — which may be another reason Suvorov liked it. (The earlier BTR models used gasoline engines.) The water jet propulsion system allows the vehicle to swim rapidly and to maneuver well in water. Even so, the BTR-50s in many units have now been replaced by tracked BMPs.

The BTR-60 family, first seen during the 7 November 1961 Moscow parade, appeared to be a radical departure from the previous BTR models. The BTR-60P is a large eight-wheeled vehicle with an inflation-deflation device and with a hull that is usually described as "boatlike." At first glance the wheels appear evenly spaced, but they actually have a slightly larger space between the second and third sets of wheels. The eight wheels are powered by two 6-cylinder 90-horsepower gasoline engines.

The BTR-60P is an open-top vehicle (no armor protection) that has been credited with carrying 8 to 16 people. The BTR-60PK, introduced in 1964, had overhead armor and the forward machinegun mount had been moved back. The BTR-60PB, which followed one year later, displayed a small turret over the second set of road wheels. The turret reportedly mounts coaxial 14.5mm and 7.62mm machineguns. Another

## COMMON LETTER DESIGNATORS FOR BTR VARIANTS

- P — Amphibious (*Plavayushchiy*)
- K — Overhead armor protection
- B — Turret
- U — Command version
- A — Antiaircraft version





BTR-70

variant, the BTR-60PU command vehicle, has a canvas top fitted over the rear of the BTR-60P.

Suvorov condemns the BTR-60 family, describing the shape of the hull not as "boatlike" but as "coffin" like. He blames the use of gasoline engines in them on a shortage of diesel fuel in the Soviet Union. According to him, since the Soviets did not have one really strong and reliable gasoline engine, they were forced to install two smaller engines from the GAZ-51 farm truck. He claims that the vehicles can enter the water quite well but can seldom get out — the two weak engines can turn either the wheels or the water propulsion system but not both at the same time, as may be required in shallow water.

Suvorov's biggest complaint, however, is with the vehicle's carrying capacity. After all the required equipment is placed in the BTR-60, there is simply no room for the 16 infantrymen it is supposed to carry. Suvorov says:

*It was much better before, when armoured personnel carriers had no armoured roof and one could put everybody one on top of the other like peasant wenches on a hay cart . . . Now we have to push all sixteen in through hatches in the roof. This is not an easy task, especially if you take into consideration the reservists' corpulence. The sergeants just have to hammer them in under the roof. Sometimes, this operation takes*

*about forty minutes.*

Suvorov claims that in order to breathe in that environment soldiers sometimes had to put on their "gas masks" and, disconnecting their filter containers from the pipes, feed the pipes out through openings in the vehicle. (This is definitely not the situation portrayed for the public.)

Several different families of BTRs were apparently employed by Arab forces in the 1967 and 1973 Mideast wars. One of the best descriptions of the way these BTRs performed in combat comes from Hans A. Kiesewetter, who, from his own explanation, was a tank officer in the *Bundeswehr*. He went to Israel in November 1973 to observe the Golan battlefield immediately after the cease-fire. Although he also noticed BTR-152s and 50Ps, his observations about the combat effects apply primarily to the BTR-60 family.

For instance, Kiesewetter describes as "amazing" the effect of high explosive shells on BTR-60s. The armor plate on the vehicles had been "torn open," he says, and the vehicles completely burned out. In another observation about "mobility kills" on these wheeled vehicles, he says that many of the abandoned vehicles were "outwardly undamaged with only the tires torn by fragmentation shells."

In addition to exporting these vehicles in large numbers, the Soviet Union, when it publicly displayed a new variant during the 7 November

1980 Moscow parade, indicated its intention to continue fielding the carrier within its own armed forces. Identified as the BTR-70, the new carrier differs from the BTR-60PB in several easily recognizable ways.

Starting at the front of the vehicle, the bow of the BTR-70 is wider and covers the front wheels, while the bow of the BTR-60PB is more pointed with its front wheels exposed. The wave deflector of the BTR-70 is on the upper side of the bow rather than on the under side as on the BTR-60PB.

The hatch configuration is also different on the BTR-70. The new commander's hatch appears angular rather than rounded, and the two rectangular hatches on the side of the hull have been eliminated. The space between the second and third axles has been increased noticeably, and the engine compartment at the rear of the vehicle appears to have been altered. This change in the engine compartment immediately led to speculation that the two 6-cylinder gasoline engines had been replaced by one or two new diesel engines.

The introduction of the BTR-70 reinforces the view that in the Soviet Army wheeled armored personnel carriers will operate alongside tracked infantry combat vehicles (BMPs) and that the wheeled version should be viewed as the standard combat vehicle of the motorized rifle force. (In central Europe, however, because of the high proportion of tank divisions, there is a ratio of about 1:1 between wheeled and tracked APCs.)


In our well-founded concern over the firepower and the other capabilities of the Soviet's tracked BMP, we need to be careful not to overlook Ivan's "other" infantry carrier, the BTR.



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# the leadership dozen

GEORGE G. EDDY



The most fascinating, exciting, and (to some) perhaps mysterious of subjects is LEADERSHIP. It has also been called an intriguing and beguiling phenomenon. And it is all these things.

For centuries this subject has attracted our never-tiring attention, and despite all the studies and books and articles and pamphlets and discourses and debates on it, we still seem to want more. It is an issue that we seemingly cannot put aside. Nor should we, because we realize that we still have more to learn; and in this realization we should remain excited about acquiring more understanding.

So, in spite of all the aspects of leadership that we claim to know, there are still some gaps. This is demonstrated by the unending difficulty we seem to have in con-

sistently identifying those who will become good leaders. Our powers of prediction, in other words, are not very strong.

The plight of the American automobile industry, for example, is well known as it struggles to keep pace with the Japanese. Many American business leaders have convinced themselves, apparently, that the Japanese have somehow discovered a magic formula that they, too, should immediately find and emulate. So they rush to Japan or flock to seminars that purport to "reveal all." Major U.S. corporations hire experts on Japanese management to show the way with "quality circles" and the like. But, in truth, have the Japanese actually invented something new? Or have they been practicing what Americans once knew and have either forgotten or dis-



carded? My own belief is in the latter.

In any event, perhaps we have not been studying the right things, or perhaps there is something wrong with our research techniques. Nonetheless, we have to press ahead, viewing much of the academic research with considerable skepticism, and believing that our common sense will put us right. For example, we usually can pinpoint the obvious "stars" and the obvious clunks, and we can deal fairly well with these extremes. It's that large group of people in the middle that keeps giving us trouble. Few would dispute the contention that we have our work cut out for us as we poke and pry into this middle group, trying to separate the potential doers from the watchers and the merely bewildered. It is in this connection that I hope what I am offering will contribute to at least a part of the solution.

We ought to start by defining what leadership is. I like the simple declaration that leadership is the practice of getting others to do what we want done and — if we are really good at it — to get them to like it while they're doing it. We are familiar with the various techniques of accomplishing this fundamental task, from the autocratic to the participative approaches that have found much favor among behavioral scientists. General George S. Patton, Jr., for instance, used to claim that he owed his success to the fact that he was "the best damned ass kicker in the Army." I think the record shows that he was skilled at considerably more than merely swinging his boot. Few, in fact, would question his abilities as a superb combat leader.

Recent studies of leadership tell us that there is no single best approach for all circumstances, that a leader needs to be able to switch his leadership style to suit the occasion. An emergency, for example, requires an instant response to orders, not a call for a vote on whether to respond. Adapting to the needs of the situation is termed the "contingency" approach. This places stringent demands on perception and rapid adjustment. Those who advise us to "hang loose" do not exactly have strong leadership in mind, but the point is quite clear.

Military leadership has much in common with leadership in other professions, but there is also a critical distinction: the actions and decisions of a military leader *directly affect men's lives*. There is no greater stake or responsibility than this. That's why those who are concerned about this really awesome responsibility spend so much time and energy and debate on the subject of leadership.

At this point, perhaps we should ask what sort of attributes a leader should have if he is to cope with the stringent demands of his position? What, in other words, should we look for in a leader? A leader should be energetic, perceptive, persistent, decisive, considerate, and flexible (yet firm). He should be reasonably intelligent, physically and mentally sound, technically competent, mature and stable (especially under stress), and responsibly daring. He should be an organizer and should have good judgment (common sense), and a high degree

of integrity (fairness).

Most of us are quite familiar with these attributes, so let's accept the list as reasonable and go on to examine some other aspects that have not received the attention I think they deserve. I call them the Leadership Dozen.

### **Watch Out for the Unready and Unwilling**

A good leader has to really enjoy being one. Nobody should be pushed or dragged or booted into a leadership slot. One of the biggest mistakes we make is to promote — formally or informally — the unwilling and the unready. Not everyone wants to be a leader; and not everyone is cut out to be a leader. Yet the system presumes that almost everyone is eager to take on this awesome responsibility. In fact, the system does not just presume, it applies considerable pressure and even sanctions against those who are *not* eager.

This means, then, that those in positions of influence need to evaluate their subordinates very carefully indeed. They should not push someone into a position just to fill a quota or for any other reason. If they persist and force the issue, they may destroy a good man who is fine in his own element but is really unsuited for a more demanding role.

It is never in the interests of an organization to destroy the talent it has. In this regard, we should be careful not to promote an individual who is technically proficient but who has never demonstrated that he is also competent to work with or to supervise others. Technical competence does not automatically confer human relations skills, nor do these skills automatically develop with the passage of time. Despite this "obvious" fact, we not only continue to promote the technician, we usually fail to give him a sensible transition period or any real guidance in acquiring and practicing human relations skills.

### **Develop an Appropriate Risk Tolerance Factor**

To bring someone else along and groom him for increased responsibility, we must be prepared to assume the risk of failure. This is seldom easy, for it entails putting our own necks on the line for the mistakes of our subordinates. The critical questions for a leader are: How long is your neck? And how much are you attached to it in its present state? Let's face it. It is not possible to develop another person without giving him enough latitude to exercise some independent judgment.

We know that when a child is learning to walk he falls down a lot. If we try to prevent his falling, he will not be inclined to move out on his own; thus, his development will be stunted. The same applies to giving a novice leader enough leeway. The valid test is by trial, and we must learn to keep hands off! Naturally, a wise mentor will provide appropriate checks or restraints to give the novice enough options while still keeping matters within

certain boundaries. As the prospective leader progresses, these constraints can and should be lifted or modified to keep encouraging him to display more initiative and resourcefulness.

Another significant point to remember is that we must show that we can accept bad news. For some, this is close to impossible, and they so berate the bearer of such news that those who first hear of it tend to suppress it. In days of yore, when kings used to behead such messengers, this tended to create a lot of vacancies in the ranks. Those individuals who were forced into such positions had to become especially artful in camouflaging or altering the facts. The superior who exploded on hearing about an impending disaster was thus gradually and inevitably denied knowledge of the actual events, frequently until it was too late for him to effect any remedies. Similarly, if we berate our neophyte leaders for every mistake, they will soon stop taking any risks, and their development will wither away.

### **Avoid Micro Management**

One of the curses of the information explosion is that it enables us to know so much about what is occurring at subordinate levels. And when we know something, the temptation to meddle can become irresistible and, in the worst cases, endemic. Bypassing the normal channels of authority, therefore, is one of the worst of organizational sins. Such tendencies are not easily controlled, despite the havoc that can result from such interference by superiors.

(Incidentally, this tendency also is present at the company and platoon level, where some officers cannot keep from interfering with the responsibilities and authorities of the NCOs. Perhaps we ought to hang a big sign in front of the desks of such superiors: "Thou Shalt Keep Thy \_\_\_\_\_ Hands Off!" (You are free to fill in the blank.) Better still, if we could employ all the technological devices at our disposal, we should be able to somehow arrange for a large bolt of electricity to enter the meddler's body at the very instant of his interference. It's interesting to contemplate, isn't it?)

### **Become a Great Asker of Questions**

We cannot function without accurate and reliable information. We can learn, of course, by reading and observing. But we can also learn a lot by asking good questions. We are all familiar with this investigative technique as practiced by the detective and the physician. Why should we be content to let it stop there?

It is essential that we develop a knack for asking important, pertinent questions — questions that I like to call "critical" questions, those that get right to the heart of the issue at hand. It's not that difficult to do, but it does require some practice. After a while, if we work at it hard enough, it becomes second nature.

Since not everyone likes to volunteer information, we have to take the initiative to find out what we want to know. (And yes, we sometimes need to be wary, too, of those who seem especially eager to tell us things.)

The general rule ought to be to ask specific questions that elicit specific replies. We need to remember, too, that people have a general tendency to tell the questioner what they think he wants to know. They do this usually in the hope that he will be pleased and go away.

An example of a poor question comes quickly to mind, one we probably resort to several times every day: "How're you doing?" And the typical response is almost always, "Fine." If we ask this type of question, we'll never learn anything important. Nor will we deserve to. [See the author's article, "Taking Command," in *INFANTRY*, May-June 1983 for examples of a questioning approach he has found useful.]

### **Become a Great Listener, a Seeker of Answers**

It doesn't do any good for us to ask good questions if we are not also good listeners. Unfortunately, most of us are actually very poor listeners. We just don't take the pains to concentrate on what the other fellow is trying to tell us. We get lazy, start screening out what we think is trivial and at that point begin to think about something else entirely. Before we know it, the conversation is over and we haven't really heard a thing.

The art of listening does not come naturally, though. We have to practice it. We go to great lengths to practice our golf or our tennis, because we already know that if we take our eye off that ball, if we lose our concentration, the consequences are going to be painful. We simply cannot function without accurate and reliable information. Doesn't it make sense, then, to apply the same effort to listening? Just as an athlete conditions his body, we need to discipline our minds and pay more attention to what others are trying to tell us.

### **Beware the Obvious**

*Obvious* is a greatly overworked word. When you come right down to it, what really is obvious? To whom? And under what circumstances? Is it obvious that John did something wrong because he didn't know what he was doing? Or was it because of conditions beyond his control — conditions that weren't so "obvious" at the time?

Being snared by the obvious is the same thing as jumping to conclusions. If you see someone standing in front of a jewelry store, then hear the burglar alarm go off and watch that same person go running off, he's obviously the burglar, isn't he? Especially if he looked furtive — looked like a crook. We spend much of our lives acting on assumptions, because it is so easy: We don't have to go out and collect data and analyze it and verify it. We



just assume that such and such is the truth without verification, and we make our decisions accordingly.

We are familiar with stereotypes, and we put all sorts of labels on people. He's a *liberal*, or she's a *radical*, and so on. But what do these labels mean? Well, the meanings are up for grabs. And since they are so fuzzy or downright misleading, they fog up our thought processes. We take the easy way out, jump to that absurd conclusion, accept that ridiculous assumption, believe that undefined label. And what happens is that we make bum decisions and become objects of ridicule.

### **Keep Your Head Out of the Sand**

It is essential that you develop a broad perspective on your environment and not be content just to focus on immediate problems and demands — as pressing as they may be. In modern organizations, many elements are interrelated and, consequently, the actions of each element affect the others. These interactions are not always immediately perceived and may, in fact, go unnoticed for a long time.

We can recognize these kinds of interactions within a unit — or we certainly should be able to — but it is easy to ignore the “outside” factors. I believe this is a mistake, for what occurs outside the unit may become extremely important sooner than we realize. We should get into the habit of continually scanning this external environment for evidence of both beneficial and potentially harmful developments.

A business executive searches for opportunities to exploit, for example, and for threats to counter. So it should be with a military organization. This means that a leader's job is just that much more complex, but that's the way things are today.

### **Don't Get Too Comfortable**

We all like to relax once in a while, to get comfortable. There's nothing really wrong with this desire — unless as leaders we get too comfortable with our situation. (Another word for comfortable is *complacent*.) A leader's work is never done. His job goes on and on, if it is done right. Certainly a leader can and should relax at appropriate times; in fact, his health and personal well-being demand it. A weary and exhausted commander is not a good decision-maker.

The point here is that a leader needs to keep things moving, keep his men challenged and caught up in their responsibilities. He needs to keep innovating, to transform the routine and the mundane into the dynamic and the exciting. Not only should he keep his own mind active, he should encourage all those around him to be alert for new and better things. Naturally, I am not suggesting that a leader should keep his unit in constant turmoil with change after change after change. That would

be absurd. The idea is for him to stimulate his people to even greater effectiveness and to encourage them to strive for more demanding goals.

### **Know When to Seek Advice**

There are times when all of us could use some effective advice. The critical part is knowing when to seek it (and from whom). There are some real psychological barriers to be overcome, though, in this sort of endeavor. There are those, for example, who believe that asking for help is a sign of weakness, and they steadfastly refuse to consider doing it. There are others who are overly sensitive to either expressed or implied criticism of their operations, especially from an outsider. There are still others who are embarrassed by some of their own mistakes and do not want anyone else to discover them.

We can do young leaders a great service by pointing out to them how important it is to recognize when there is a problem or a developing situation that is beyond their control or their ability to resolve. If a leader has established a bond of trust and mutual respect between himself and his subordinates, then this should go a long way toward dispelling the typical misgivings that usually attend a request for assistance. If such a bond does not exist, then it is up to the leader to build it — and fast. If he cannot do this with a particular subordinate, then he should replace that subordinate with another who can earn his respect.

In some cases, a leader should seek advice from members of the unit as well. Those closest to the action and the problems associated with it usually have some excellent ideas for improvement. By all means, the leader should ask those individuals for their suggestions. And, of course, he should make sure they get the credit in a way that lets everyone else in the unit know about it.

### **Stability and Unit Cohesiveness**

The turnover of key personnel is the bane of organizational stability. Commanders at higher levels who have some say in assignment and reassignment policies are the key to the solution to this problem. But even within a company, its commander has a great deal to say about the time his soldiers spend in an assignment. For instance, he should reflect carefully before making any personnel changes, and he should try to gauge the implications of those changes for the individual soldiers and for the unit itself.

Cohesiveness requires some glue, and people should stick to their jobs until they become proficient. They are the ones who set the examples for newcomers to emulate through earned respect for their demonstrated competence. Men need some worthwhile affiliation, something with which they can identify with pride, and they need to develop the same spirit of comradeship that

forms the cornerstone of loyalty to their immediate groups and, ultimately, to their organizations.

### Concentrate on the Individual

Most of the studies of military organizations, especially those made of units in combat, tend to focus on the units and not on the men in those units. Since men function on a unit basis, this approach is understandable. But it does appear to ignore the individual soldier. We speak almost always of squads and crews and batteries and troops. We say that each man is a member of a team and that he is expected to contribute his part. This is most important, we point out, especially when it is reinforced by the strong personal ties and the allegiance we want to see develop within that team. Yet there is doubt in my mind that we really pay enough attention to the individual.

We all agree that we need to fit the man properly to the job, but the jokes about malassignments persist. So something is wrong somewhere. While the extent of the problem varies among units, fundamentally it results from the fact that we make too many assumptions about individuals and tend to regard them as coming from the same "lump of clay." My experience with organizations has convinced me that our knowledge of the individual is largely superficial and that those individuals in leadership positions typically make only token efforts to learn what an individual believes is important to him.

But it is only with such knowledge that we can ever hope to develop truly effective organizations, because this kind of knowledge is basic to any true job assignment. More often than not, though, we seem to stuff men into jobs in much the same way we stuff a turkey. We just want to fill all the holes, tidy it up, and secure it. Then we stick the bird in the oven, set the timer, and forget it until it's done. How many units have we cooked in the same way, I wonder?

We cannot please everyone, nor should we try. But we certainly can try for a better match between man and job and machine than we usually end up with. We can get good performance from a soldier only if that soldier "fits" his job, both technically and psychologically. Can't we at least recognize his personal needs and desires in the assignment process?

We say that we are concerned about performance and what motivates it. It will never happen as we expect it to unless we make a genuine effort to accommodate personal and unit "desires" more effectively. *Never should we take an individual for granted.*

### Identifying and Changing Attitudes

Changing attitudes goes directly with concentrating on the individual, for if we handle the assignment task properly we will already have taken a major step toward positively influencing individual attitudes. Every job in

an organization is accomplished through the combination of two critical factors: technical skill (the ability to do it) and the application of that skill (a willingness to use that skill).

To have an effective unit, each member should know the organization's goals, should identify with them, and should commit himself to their fulfillment within his area of responsibility. Thus, we have to make sure the goals are known, understood, and, ultimately, accepted, before anything can happen.


Leaders have the chore of trying to provide the appropriate motivational climate within their units to stimulate the soldiers to perform in the desired manner. One of the first steps the leaders must take on this long, long trail is to find out what the attitudes of the individual soldiers in the units are and how these attitudes might be affecting their present job performance. The idea is to develop appropriate incentives in the individual soldiers so that effective teamwork will develop. It is worthwhile here to remember that what is an incentive for one of them may not automatically be an incentive for another. Of course, there cannot be a hundred different incentives for a unit of a hundred men. What a leader needs to do is to work out a sensible blend of incentives to fit his unit's circumstances.

### SUMMARY

Leadership is an art, not a science. Leadership, though, can and should call upon science for help in solving technical problems. Leadership practices can be learned and improved upon by study and application. Like an aspiring painter, a novice leader can learn much from observing a master in action. He can also learn from reading about the exploits and writings of others.

Finally, those in leadership positions must never forget their tasks of training, educating, and developing others who are in their charge. Unfortunately, there are some leaders in the Army who conclude that this task is the sole responsibility of the various service schools. This idea must be overcome, and leaders must be impressed with the realization that they must assume *personal responsibility for and become personally involved* in such developmental activities.

Trying to get this message across to his subordinate commanders is one of the most difficult tasks a company or a battalion commander faces. Rote observance of a training schedule will never do it. As Will Rogers advised us years ago, "It's not what you pay a man that counts, but what he costs you."



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COLONEL THOMAS B. VAUGHN



# BATTALION COMMAND

## A PERSONAL PHILOSOPHY



In my judgment, a personal philosophy of command does not exist in a vacuum. Nor is it something you can "acquire" in a pre-command course. On the contrary, a personal command philosophy is a complex set of notions gleaned from study, experience, and, time permitting, considerable reflection.

A command philosophy also partakes variously of an individual's self-image and of how he views people generally, even how he relates to his superiors, peers, and subordinates in a particular command environment. The latter relationships, however, pertain more to behavior and style than to philosophy itself. This is not to suggest a chameleon approach to command, but it is to suggest that a philosophy of command worthy of the phrase endures while behavior and style may change with the environment.

My own philosophy of command stems from my philosophy of leadership. In essence, the following observations synthesize, with regard to leadership and command, what I call "A Theory of Expectations":

- Most people want to perform, achieve, produce.
- Most people like to think that whatever they are involved in is worthwhile and that it is so recognized by others whom they respect.
- Some people do not perform, achieve, produce, or they do so at levels that are unacceptable to the organization to which they belong.
- For the purpose of analysis and corrective action, non-performers either don't know or don't care.
- The leader's critical tasks are to distinguish between performers and non-performers (or low-performers), and then either to integrate them into the unit or to separate those who don't measure up.
- Rewards and punishment are essential to motivating both individuals and groups in the Army.

Clearly, effective leadership at any level requires more than just a philosophy; it requires action. This is particularly true of command. If a commander is not a man of action, he is merely a figurehead, contributing about as much to his unit as the figure on a ship's bow does to the navigation of the ship.

My approach to command, I believe, is consistent with my overall philosophy of leadership. In both, I view people in general and soldiers in particular in terms that are essentially positive, essentially optimistic. In both, I recognize the value of integrating individual goals with unit goals whenever possible and feasible. Most impor-



tant, both my approach and my philosophy have worked well so far for me. Thus, I am comfortable with them and I will continue to be guided by the values they encompass.

What, then, is my approach to exercising command at the battalion level?

First, it seems to me, a battalion commander needs to understand and accept the simple fact that he is now a battalion commander, and no longer a company commander. Obviously, this point is more than just one of perspective; it relates also to command behavior and style. The way a battalion commander views his role with regard to his subordinates, peers, and superiors will set the tone for the way he will run his battalion.

Second, the battalion commander must beware of the tyranny of nostalgia. That is, he must resist the temptation to try to resolve the problems of the present with solutions from the past. This does not, of course, mean that experience is irrelevant. It simply means that organizations change over time and so do the problems of group dynamics. What worked well for an officer as a company commander in, say, Hawaii in 1977 may be of little or no use to him as a battalion commander in Germany in 1984. Thus, the battalion commander of the 1980s needs to temper his prior experiences with reflection and study, and with a fresh analysis of the command environment of which he is now a part.

Someone has said that "the reward of the general is not a bigger tent, but command." Surely, the same should be true for colonels and captains. To command soldiers at any level is a rare privilege, an opportunity to serve in the fullest sense. To command soldiers at battalion level is rarer still, a privilege extended to a relative handful of the many who are qualified. It is, in short, an unusual opportunity to serve; it should not be viewed as a perquisite for personal gain.

## FOCUS

I believe it was Casey Stengel who said, "If you don't know where you are going, you are liable to end up somewhere else!" This aphorism applies, obviously, to more than baseball. By focusing on his mission, the battalion commander will be able to distinguish between the critical and the important, and between the routine and the trivial. These distinctions are as necessary as they are difficult, because once he has made them, he can set realistic goals and objectives, determine priorities, and allocate resources. Focusing on the mission should also clarify his thinking and lend substance to his actions. His failure to focus on his mission will muddle his thinking, thwart meaningful action, and leave him and his unit floundering from crisis to crisis.

The welfare of the soldiers and the accomplishment of the mission are not, as some would suggest, competing concerns. They are part of the total process of command. To the extent that we take care of our soldiers (and their families, too), we contribute to a sense of belonging, unit



identification, pride, and esprit. In turn, this contributes to mission accomplishment — if it is properly done.

There are pitfalls, however. Chief among these, it seems to me, is a facade of concern pasted on the reality of neglect. The prudent commander will avoid this pitfall by assuring that taking care of soldiers is ingrained in the everyday life of his unit and that it is not relegated to catchy slogans and morale support activities.

For the commander, though, the welfare of his soldiers transcends matters of comfort, mood, and even morale (narrowly defined). It extends, for example, to seeing that his soldiers clean their weapons, vehicles, and other combat gear immediately upon returning from the field so that they will be ready to go again with little or no notice.

The welfare of soldiers extends to training as well. In essence, our Army has two vital missions: to train and, if called upon, to fight. If we do the first well, we are infinitely more likely to do the second well, too. Unfortunately, the converse is also true — if we train poorly, we are more likely to fight poorly. Poor training only permits soldiers to practice their mistakes; thus, they become very good at being very wrong. Poor training is the ultimate insult to the soldier and to the unit. The prudent commander, therefore, will satisfy himself that his unit is well-trained, individually and collectively. In so doing, he will actually be taking the longer view of the welfare of his soldiers.

A commander would also do well to remind himself



frequently that those who wear the uniform are soldiers first and officers, noncommissioned officers, and others second. Soldiering is not a vocation or an avocation. It is a time-honored profession — a way of life. Officers and noncommissioned officers are the profession's gatekeepers and standard bearers. They determine, in large measure, who enters and who leaves, who advances and who does not. This awesome responsibility must not be taken lightly. Rather, it must be seized upon at every opportunity, and especially in terms of the professional development of subordinates.

## DO IT BETTER

The professional development of subordinates is a function of leadership that is widely preached but not so widely practiced. It makes so much sense, theoretically and practically, that it deserves the commander's early and continuing emphasis. Why don't we do it better?

The first obstacle is time. The pace of the workaday battalion is fast and furious. In the press of meeting crisis after crisis, developing subordinates all too often gets short shrift, but it should not and the battalion commander must see that it does not. By planning ahead, by focusing on his mission, and by assessing the talents of his subordinates, he can and must take the time to train, educate, develop, and evaluate them. This is the essence of professional development; it is the tie that binds individuals and groups into competent, confident, spirited units.

A reluctance to reassign people is another obstacle to professional development. It is, however, a false issue. Personnel turnover is a fact of life in the Army — and it always will be. The key point is to make change work *for* professional development and not *against* it. After all, most personnel gains and losses are predictable. The prudent commander should anticipate these personnel changes and should be ready to use them to the long-range benefit of his people and his unit.

A third obstacle and, in my opinion, the toughest one to breach, is the risk associated with the professional development of subordinates. We often hear, "I'd really like to give Lieutenant Shagnasty a shot at being the battalion antitank platoon leader, but I'm just not sure he can handle it." Or "I'd really like to help Captain Smedlap get that job in the brigade S-3 shop, but I just can't afford to lose him." All too often these are only the plaintive wails of an insecure, shortsighted commander.

On the other hand, the conscientious, concerned commander who truly has the interests of his subordinates and the Army at heart will take some short-range risks to

reap the long-range benefits of professionally developing his people.

The obstacles of time, personnel turnover, and risk are by no means insurmountable. But they must be dealt with boldly and diligently. A "master plan" for professionally developing officers, noncommissioned officers, and other soldiers is a valuable management technique for dealing with these issues. [See the author's "Bolstering the Backbone," *INFANTRY*, May-June 1980, page 25.]

A word of caution, though: Such a plan must not become just another item on the AGI checklist, another requirement met. Instead, it must be carried out with command and staff commitment and involvement. Otherwise, the result will be merely an illusion of professional development, not the reality of it.

Finally, I would suggest that a battalion commander, early in his command tour, assess the reward and punishment situation in his unit. After all, incentives and awards, along with sanctions, contribute immensely to individual morale and to unit esprit and cohesion. Most soldiers like to be recognized for their excellence and expect to pay for their transgressions. Commanders should not disappoint their soldiers on either count.

A sound policy of incentives and awards should encourage the pursuit of excellence, especially in training, supply, mess, transportation, maintenance, and administration. It should not, however, encourage cutthroat competition and lapses in ethics. In my view, having soldiers compete against a standard of excellence rather than against each other is preferable for most events.

Discipline is the hallmark of the professional military unit. Self-discipline is the ideal to strive for. Short of that, though, there must be a command environment that enforces high standards of military appearance, conduct, and performance. Punishment, where necessary, must be swift and sure. Moreover, it must be fair, with due regard for the offender as well as the offense.

This, then, is a bit of my personal philosophy and approach to command. As I said at the outset, it stems from my views on leadership in general. All I can honestly say is that it has worked well so far for me. As for others, "to thine own self, be true."



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# junior leader PROFICIENCY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL RICHARD F. TIMMONS



They just don't know their jobs! That's about as fundamental a statement as anyone can make concerning the professional proficiency of our junior leaders. As an infantryman, I know this is the case in my branch and feel reasonably safe in making that same assumption for the other branches as well.

The potential effect of this condition on a unit's combat readiness is apparent. Unfortunately, that effect does not present itself until a unit is tested in battle, too often with tragic results. In far too many cases we deceive ourselves by confusing physical appearance, bravado, aggressiveness, and loud noise with capable units and leaders. Only under the right conditions — and these are very few — can this relationship have any relevance.

As a battalion commander I focused on the small matters of soldiering. I don't know whether my unit was unique in this regard, but I do know that few of my leaders, commissioned or noncommissioned officers, came to the battalion equipped to see that the fine points of soldiering were taken care of to a standard that would ensure our success.

At the battalion level and below, virtually everything rests on very minor details. And if these are not properly attended to, poor performance or failure will result. When junior leaders do not understand this fact, and if they cannot identify these minor details, senior leaders



become routinely engaged in over-supervising them in common matters in an attempt to correct the oversights. Some of this is obviously inevitable, but it is normally manageable if the important details and the fundamentals have been established through the Army's school system, drilled into the students, and reinforced by the unit under professionally educated superiors.

Junior leaders make things happen in both peace and war. Corps and division orders really boil down to individual soldiers taking some action to accomplish a job, and these soldiers are almost always led, and held to a standard, by lieutenants and sergeants. But the Army's equation for developing solid junior leaders is not operating well today, and the linkage between the individuals, the service schools, and the units needs attention.

As a starting point for repairing this breakdown, the Army must expect a lot from its school system — a school, through its training, should be confident enough when it releases a young leader to the field to send with him an itemized list of the tasks that he is now fully able to do. This approach can work, however, only if the school has a good description of the tasks the Army wants the young leader to be able to do, gives him a solid, practical foundation in those tasks, and requires high standards of performance in them.

The backbone of this general philosophy for the development of junior leaders must include the following:

- Defining what junior leaders must be able to do in a troop unit and tailoring service school courses to support these needs. (The word *familiarization* should be avoided.)

- Focusing on practical application and understanding. (Most can read; *doing* is the key.)

- Graduating only those who have *mastered* the skills and making this a matter of record.

- Deciding what subject matter must be deferred to a later course and, very cautiously, considering what training the units might be able to absorb.

- Initiating continuous career professional studies that bind schooling and field service together and that are aimed at understanding the art and science of war.

The crux of the problem of producing proficient junior leaders, then, rests upon identifying the skills they must master. But what are these essential skills, and who is to decide on them?

Since this article is a personal perspective, my thoughts and opinions on the subject will obviously hold sway, and they will be focused primarily on the infantry. But I hope to suggest some ideas that relate to instilling the basic skills in junior leaders before they join their units in the field. And much of the material has application to specialties, MOSs, and career management fields other than infantry.

## WHAT LEADERS MUST KNOW

There are certain "how to" requirements that, if

junior leaders understand them, will take care of their immediate problems, tasks, or missions. These "how to's" will also contribute to unit discipline and standardization, as well as a feeling on the part of the troops that their outfit is organized and knows what it is about.

There are several subject areas the service schools should be teaching and thinking about in relation to educating junior leaders for duty with a field unit.

### Field Duties

Junior leaders must completely understand, for example, the skills involved in individual and small unit tactics and must be able to do and explain all of these skills to their subordinates:

- Rush, crawl, road march, go through tactical wire, throw a hand grenade, use a bayonet, use range cards, read a map, employ a claymore mine, use hand, arm, and whistle signals, and use overlays and military graphic symbols.

- The basic body firing positions for riflemen, Dragon gunners, LAW gunners, and machinegunners; the correct construction of fighting positions for M203, Dragon, TOW, mortar, machinegun, and rifle; fire team formations, squad formations, and the conditions for changing formations.

- Analyze a squad or platoon sector before movement or defense, so the correct formations and terrain are used.

- Write operations and patrol orders.

- Use platoon tactical movement, including where in the movement formation soldiers and weapons are placed and why.

- Position weapons on the move or in the defense.

- Use the Battalion Training Management System at squad, platoon, and company levels.

- Establish a squad, platoon, and company defense, including tactical wire entanglements.

- Apply field hygiene for the individual and the squad, such as inspecting feet, checking water intake, full ration consumption, and shaving.

- Fire every weapon in the platoon. (A detailed understanding of marksmanship is absolutely essential, for if our soldiers are unable to shoot, everything else loses meaning. For example, trust and confidence between soldiers is inconceivable if each man knows the others are inept marksmen and cannot be relied upon to eliminate any enemy threat. This shreds the fabric of cohesion and teamwork before other positive influences ever begin to work.)

And, finally, junior leaders must learn that compassion, respect, cheerfulness, and concern for their soldiers' welfare are not signs of weakness in a leader, but are the indicators of self-confidence and a genuine regard for the dignity of those he leads.

This list could be more extensive, but these are the fundamental tactical procedures or skills that service schools

should dwell on and that all officers or NCOs should master before being placed in charge of soldiers.

## Equipment

Junior leaders must understand the proper procedures for assembling, adjusting, and distributing the soldier's load using CTA 50-900 load-bearing equipment. Generally speaking, most junior leaders do not know the proper way to wear the basic field uniform items and how these items work together to produce a progressively protective system against the elements and still remain compatible with existence and fighting loads under combat conditions. Strings, straps, elastic cords, snaps, buckles, clips, eyelets, grommets, fasteners, quick releases, and velcro are routinely configured in imaginative but incorrect ways. Leaders often cannot see that things are fouled up until an item of equipment has been lost, broken, or destroyed, or until the soldier is overly fatigued or a heat or frostbite casualty because he has been "fighting his own gear."

These leaders must be totally familiar with every piece of equipment in the platoon including its capabilities, its disassembly, assembly, maintenance, troubleshooting, safety, and proper use. Generally, it is beyond the unit's capability to educate leaders correctly on all of these fine points (all critical to success once in action), especially if the unit's leaders themselves have not been appropriately educated as their careers progressed.

Few junior leaders know anything about tentage, screens, tarps, or canvas, much less the appropriate knots or tension devices used to erect and secure them. They only superficially understand the functioning, maintenance, and capabilities of weapons, communication equipment, NBC items, and medical materiel, "because," they say, "each battalion has MOSs for those areas with school-trained experts who know what they are doing." But this statement is only marginally valid, and its popular acceptance routinely leads to trouble. Automotive equipment such as vehicles, generators, and chainsaws suffer the same ailments; leaders are ignorant of their proper use, maintenance, and safety.

Junior leaders know little about accountability for military equipment and its components using the standard publications, and how to inspect for serviceability, cleanliness, and equipment records.

All this may seem terribly boring to many and wholly unworthy of officer and NCO involvement within a costly school system, but there is not a more cost effective means of improving the combat-readiness of line units than by compelling young leaders to become immersed in the practical details associated with their MOSs or specialties.

## Maintenance

The great emphasis that has been placed on automotive



Most junior leaders only superficially understand the functioning, maintenance, and capabilities of NBC items.

maintenance during the past few years must be continued; but weapons, communications, clothing, organizational equipment, and NBC procedures require strong emphasis, too. Junior leaders generally cannot inspect anything very well. They must be taught how to inspect and what to look for — the good and bad indicators for each item of equipment, the documents that accompany each piece of equipment, what components and tools go with the equipment and their condition, the publications that are critical, and what the users must know. All of these are critical if the unit is to have functional equipment, unit discipline, and preparedness. Junior leaders must also understand the foundation of the Army maintenance system. They must:

- Know the "-10" publications for all equipment in their charge.
- Know how to conduct a PMCS (preventive maintenance checks and services).
- Know how to complete a DA Form 2404.
- Know the basic documents and records for each piece of equipment in their unit.
- Understand the various periodic checks, services, inspections, and calibrations for all equipment in the unit.
- Understand the rudiments of the company and battalion maintenance systems.



- Be capable of inspecting unit tools for completeness and serviceability.
- Know Army and unit standards for serviceability, cleanliness, and reporting.

### Administration

Most junior leaders have little or no understanding of the basic administrative procedures that are standard for every unit. Lieutenants, therefore, should know how to explain, conduct, or prepare the following:

- Reports of survey.
- Line-of-duty investigations.
- Cash collection vouchers.
- Bars to reenlistment.
- Duty rosters.
- Letters of reprimand.
- Sworn statements.
- Counselling statements for enlisted and NCO personnel.
- Completion of EERs and SEERs.
- Completion of OER Support Form 67-8-1.
- Headcount rosters for mess.
- Hand receipts.
- Company grade Article 15s.

They must know how to use the Army publications system and where to look to find FMs, TMs, circulars, bulletins, ARs, SBs, the AMDEF, ARTEPs, and, most important, how to extract pertinent data from these sources.

All leaders, corporal and above, should understand Army finance procedures, including pay, allowances, rations, quarters, leave, TDY, and per diem. Each should have in his possession an abbreviated reference that explains these important subjects.

### UCMJ

Junior leaders must know what authority they have been given to handle difficult subordinates and which actions are appropriate to good order and discipline. In addition, they must understand the rights of the soldier, procedures of evidence, rules of search and seizure, company grade Article 15 procedures, and Chapters 5, 9, 13, and 14 in AR 635-200. How to give orders is extremely important, and what constitutes an obeyable order — on and off post and in and out of uniform — must receive thorough attention.

### Miscellaneous

In addition to these categories of knowledge, there is a miscellaneous assortment of tasks junior leaders are frequently called upon to know something about or to do:

- Prepare a class, lesson plan, or demonstration.
- Direct a range properly and safely.

- Draft a unit SOP or set of instructions.
- Counsel subordinates.
- Establish and direct programs for the overweight.
- Explain to the soldiers (at their own level) how the enlisted promotion system operates.
- Know the organizations and agencies that provide services for enlisted men during times of need and where to find them (PAC, IG, AER, ARC, for instance, and legal assistance, drug and alcohol control offices, chaplain, finance).
- Describe fully the duties and responsibilities of the platoon sergeant and the squad leader.
- Supervise or execute basic military formations such as inspections, guard mounts, and flag details, as outlined in FM 22-5 and 22-6.
- Conduct PT correctly using the proper procedures, commands, and formations.
- Know what constitutes a meaningful order, not from a legal standpoint but from an effectiveness perspective.
- Know the responsibilities of a duty officer.
- Analyze and conduct squad and platoon training. (Determine objectives, evaluate current status, identify weaknesses, write a program to sustain the good training and fix the weak, calculate the resources needed, and conduct post-training evaluations.)

If one catch-phrase could summarize these general matters, the most applicable would undoubtedly be *pay attention to detail*. The clear object must be *educating and understanding* — familiarization is not enough.

### WHAT THE SCHOOLS MUST DO

Our military schools are the most important asset we have for preparing the present and future leaders of the Army. But they are an asset only as long as they can provide the product required, and in that connection I have several thoughts about service school attitudes and forcefulness in requiring high standards of performance and integrity. There can be no compromise in either area.

The school standards of achievement must be high but realistic. There must be a penalty for those who fail to measure up, and that penalty should be reduction or separation. If a leader returns from an Army program of instruction and takes charge of a unit without knowing the fundamentals of his business, his lack of knowledge becomes immediately clear to all his subordinates and makes a mockery of that school's program.

If the schools let slight indiscretions in integrity slip by, they merely reinforce the individual's conviction that the Army condones "small lies and cribbing." This, in turn, translates at the unit level into false reporting, false documents, and white lies to cover up unreliable performance. Regardless of an individual's good and determined attitude, if he is unable to do the work the Army requires of his grade and MOS, this must become a matter of record, and action must be taken immediately to further educate, transfer, or reduce him or to separate him from the service. Tactical units must not be burdened with non-

performers who have somehow passed through the Army's school system. This includes those who cannot effectively read, write, speak, or understand our basic language.

One of the schools' most important roles must be to emphasize and explain their own institutional standards. The standards should be clear and understood by everyone who passes through the educational process; this would promote standardization between the individual, the school, and the unit. Ignorance of institutional standards is the nub of the unsatisfactory results that plague the Army from top to bottom today and that foster a confusing array of ad hoc standards that range from the unrealistically high to the almost nonexistent. This is frustrating to men and organizations, and it produces unexpected results (more often bad than good) even in the same units. Such unpredictability is the antithesis of reliability, and reliability is essential in the military services; it is the foundation for all planning and operations.

A final crucial responsibility for the military schools is sowing the seeds for a distant harvest. The business of war is best described as part art, part science. In recent years, our record has been reasonably good when judged from the scientific aspect. What is totally absent, however, is a focus upon the art of war itself — the pre-eminent subject for the soldier, and the most challenging one. A steady and deliberate approach to reading and studying the art of war must commence early, and must never cease throughout a career. Only through continuous application and thoughtful reflection on the dimensions of war will career officers be able to maintain a perspective on the requirements for waging it successfully.

Under the current system, the goal is to train the new infantry soldier in about 170 basic tasks as a prerequisite to making him a proficient infantryman. It is an excellent approach to define exactly what tasks a soldier needs to be able to perform, because this definition provides a focus and a structure for the development of training materials, doctrine, and training goals and objectives. So, a unit can expect to receive a young soldier who:

- Is disciplined.
- Is physically fit (conditioned to run, road march, do PT, and complete obstacle courses).
- Is a confident and proficient marksman with his basic weapon, and has experience in the use of all infantry weapons — machinegun, LAW, Dragon, hand grenades, claymore mine, 40mm, antitank/antipersonnel mine, 90mm recoilless rifle. (I know the 90mm recoilless rifle is no longer in the infantry battalion, but what a travesty it is to have our only versatile MOUT weapon and close-in antitank defense taken away.)

- Can properly construct fighting positions for each weapon listed above.

- Is trained to use the bayonet.
- Knows how to assemble, wear, adjust, and inspect his garrison and field uniforms and equipment.
- Is fully capable of cleaning, inspecting, and maintaining his weapon, clothing, and equipment.
- Knows and executes basic military customs and courtesies.
- Understands basic military laws, orders, and procedures.
- Can perform basic life-saving first aid.
- Is knowledgeable concerning field sanitation and hygiene.
- Has a positive attitude and wants to be in the Army.

The soldier who fits this description is the clay that must later be molded by the junior leaders in his unit. There is a distinct parallel, therefore, between what the junior leader must know and what skills a soldier should have acquired. If the leader does not know these fundamental skills, how can he possibly identify the soldier's weaknesses, remedy them, and sustain the crucial standards that are the backbone of an organization? Quite obviously, he cannot.

As a consequence, many units exist in a miasma of mediocrity, and they struggle just to get by each day and "pass" each event. It is unthinkable that these units might be called on to go into combat tomorrow. They deserve better qualified and more effective leaders.


Everyone is a victim of his own experience and quite naturally believes he has the wisdom, as a result of that experience, to set things right if only everyone else would do it his way. The foregoing commentary is, of course, *my* wisdom, and it obviously has application only under certain conditions and under the proper guidance. But I still believe that our junior leaders are not well prepared to assume their field responsibilities and that the Army, consequently, is less able than it could be.

I hope my observations stimulate our young leaders, our schools, and our units to think, change, and improve their efforts to achieve a higher level of junior leader proficiency. It is the only way we can improve our readiness and sustain our long-term combat effectiveness.



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# the making of an

CAPTAIN ROBERT C. PITTARD

## INFANTRY LIEUTENANT

Some people may think that leadership is leadership, that no matter what branch of service a soldier is in, the leadership principles remain the same. This may be true, but the instructors at the Infantry School, and in particular those in the Leadership Branch, like to think that there is such a thing as a unique Infantry brand of leadership. After all, there must be a difference between a leader who has to lead his men into combat and one who has to motivate his soldiers to do administrative work or drive a truck. It is the application of the universal leadership principles to the exceptional needs of the infantry that makes the Infantry School's leadership instruction unique. And it is this Infantry brand of leadership that a lieutenant takes with him to his first assignment after he completes the Infantry Officer Basic Course (IOBC).

The leadership instruction in the Infantry Officer Basic Course (IOBC) — all 48 hours of it — is soldier-oriented; the focus is not only on the soldiers and NCOs of the first platoon a lieutenant will lead, but on the lieutenant himself. The emphasis is not on the leader as a manager,

but on the leader as a teacher — one who can develop his subordinate leaders to the level where they can operate independently.

During the first four hours of leadership instruction, the lieutenant is introduced to the concept of “Be, Know, Do” — what the lieutenant needs to “Be” in order to become a professional Army officer and leader; what he needs to “Know” to be an effective leader; and what he must “Do” to turn a platoon of soldiers into a cohesive and productive unit. The “Be, Know, Do” concept provides a framework into which all the following instruction fits. That instruction is designed to improve the lieutenant's understanding of the “Be, Know, Do” concept and its practical application to him as an infantry officer.

The first area of consideration — “Be” — concerns the lieutenant himself and involves the professional and soldierly qualities he needs to be a good leader. He is taught that as an Army officer he is a member of a unique profession and that an inherent part of that profession is a code of ethics — a code that has its foundation in our basic national values and is exemplified in the oath of office he took when he was commissioned. The lieutenant is also given an opportunity for self-assessment in his preferred leadership and followship styles.

The second area of consideration is what the lieutenant should “Know.” The instructors stress that the lieutenant should know himself, his capabilities, his strengths, and his weaknesses. They also teach the lieutenant to capitalize on his strengths and work on his weaknesses. At the same time, the instructors stress that the new lieutenant must also do all that he can to understand his soldiers and their capabilities, strengths, and weaknesses.

During this phase of instruction, counseling techniques and communicative skills are emphasized to give the new platoon leader the tools he needs to interact with his subordinates on a one-to-one basis. One of the methods used to drive home the counseling and communicative skills taught in the classroom is the counseling laboratory. Each lieutenant in the course takes part in two counseling lab sessions.

In the first, the lieutenant is exposed to situations in which a soldier or an NCO has a performance or personal problem. The scenarios are provided through role-playing and through the interactive videodisc system. (This system, which employs a laser videodisc with a computer, gives the lieutenant an opportunity to exercise his counseling skills and allows him to make mistakes in a controlled, supervised, practice environment.) The second counseling lab session consists entirely of role-playing and the situations in it are more complex. This complexity requires the lieutenant to use his counseling skills and to apply some institutional knowledge, especially in the use of referral agencies. Through these counseling labs the School tries to instill in the lieutenant a better understanding of his future soldiers and the types of problems he will have to contend with in his unit on a day-to-day basis.

Another aspect of the "Know" portion of the concept is for the lieutenant to know his job. As a platoon leader he must be technically and tactically proficient if he hopes to lead his platoon and gain the respect of his men; soldiers will not follow a leader who does not know his job. In addition to knowing his own job the lieutenant should also know the jobs of his subordinates as well as or better than they do. This means that he is expected to be proficient in the tasks for Skill Levels 1 through 4 and to know how to employ his platoon in a tactical situation.

The final part of the "Be, Know, Do" concept — "Do" — includes the things the lieutenant must do to direct and motivate his soldiers to accomplish the mission. The lieutenant, therefore, is taught how to make decisions using a seven-step decision-making process, and then how to implement those decisions. This process includes the important matter of resource management, and the lieutenant is taught how to plan to use his resources — time, equipment, and men — and how to assign priorities for the use of those resources when there is a shortage.

Finally, a lieutenant is taught how to motivate his soldiers to carry out the decisions and plans he wants to implement. In this class the lieutenant studies various theories of motivation and how he, as a leader, can create the right motivational climate in his platoon.

With all of this under his belt, the lieutenant is well versed in theory, and he has also taken part in some practical exercises designed to reinforce that theory. Later, during the "soldier-team development" phase of instruction, the lieutenant is required to bring together all he has learned and apply it to a simulated situation. That situation begins with the lieutenant arriving at his first unit and progresses through his first few months as a platoon leader. In these classes the lieutenant must use his communicative and counseling skills and must make decisions and then plan and implement those decisions using his available resources.

As a part of this instruction, the student is first taught a four-step approach to taking charge of his platoon — how to study the situation in the platoon; how to meet his subordinates; how to analyze and assess his soldiers' strengths and weaknesses; and how to take any corrective action that may be needed. He is also shown how to develop an ethical climate in his platoon through his personal example and through his attitude toward unethical behavior in his subordinates.

At the end of this period of instruction, the lieutenant

writes a plan in which he must identify the critical weaknesses of a unit and show how he would alleviate those weaknesses, what resources he would use, and which individual soldiers he would assign to carry out his plan. (This phase of instruction was designed to give the student an opportunity to use his leadership skills, practice developing a cohesive unit in a capsulized scenario, and make mistakes before arriving at his first unit.)

The remainder of the leadership instruction in IOBC deals with duties, responsibilities, and authority; special leadership issues; and battlefield leadership. During the class on duties, responsibilities, and authority, for example, the lieutenant is taught the duties and responsibilities of an officer and how these duties and responsibilities differ from an NCO's. The lieutenant is also shown how to use his authority, how to delegate that authority, and how to continuously strive to teach his subordinates and give them opportunities to develop as leaders themselves.

The class on the special leadership issues includes discussions of the Army's policy on alcohol and drug abuse, equal opportunity, and sexual harassment. The problem of stress is also discussed: what causes stress and how to manage it on an individual and an organizational level.

The last class the lieutenant receives before graduating is one on battlefield leadership. Until this time, the subject of combat is never really addressed, but during this period the lieutenant is shown dramatizations and film clips of actual combat footage to reinforce the lecture portion of the class. He is taught the conditions that can contribute to fear and panic in the face of the enemy and what he as the leader can do to lessen the effect of those conditions.

This, in a nutshell, is the leadership instruction an infantry lieutenant currently receives in the Infantry Officer Basic Course. The aim of the instruction is to expose the new Infantry lieutenant to the Army's current leadership doctrine and to help prepare him to take charge of his platoon immediately and become an effective link in his unit's chain of command.



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# independence ON THE MODERN BATTLEFIELD

CAPTAIN ROBERT L. MAGINNIS

In the Army's manuals and in some current futuristic fiction as well, the next war is described as one in which independent, small-unit operations will be inevitable. General Sir John Hackett's novel *The Third World War*, for example, portrays a modern war with weapons of mass destruction, an overwhelming enemy, and poor communications. And Field Manual 100-5, the Army's operations manual, says that "the fluid nature of modern war will place a premium on leadership, unit cohesion, and effective independent operations. The manual goes on to say that commanders will find it difficult to determine what is happening, that small units will often have to fight without sure knowledge about their force as a whole, and that subordinates must therefore "exploit successes boldly and take advantage of unforeseen opportunities." To do these things, the manual says, "improvisation, initiative, and aggressiveness — the traits that have historically distinguished the American soldier — must be particularly strong in our leaders."

From the early days of the American Revolution to the

"Grey Fox" of the Civil War to Vietnam, our history has recorded incidents in which American leaders had to operate autonomously because of unexpected developments. If the ability to act independently was desirable in the past, in the future it will be not only desirable but necessary.

To prepare today's small unit leaders to meet the demands of future battles, we should deliberately plan to instill in them the leadership skills that history has shown to be essential for independent small-unit operations. We can start by describing the ideal independent battle leader:

He is creative and innovative — he always looks for better ways of doing things and is not afraid of new ideas. He is flexible — if something does not work one way, he tries another approach. He does not hesitate to alter a course of action when the resources suddenly change.

He is decisive and has some simple but effective guiding principles that help his decision-making process. Once he has identified a problem, assessed the alterna-





The ideal independent battle leader is committed to the unit mission.

tives, and made a decision, then he acts. He is not a procrastinator.

He is self-confident. He exemplifies strength under fire. He knows how to gain trust as a battle leader. He understands motivation, unit morale, and the esprit of the unit.

He is comfortable with autonomy. He likes to be the boss. He does not feel the need to confirm his decisions constantly with a higher authority.

He is aggressive. He takes charge and leads his unit to accomplish its mission. He understands the principles of war and uses the right combination to fit the situation.

He knows his people and understands their strengths and weaknesses, what motivates them, and who can do what. He knows his equipment and his weapons, too, and is not afraid of new systems. Technology does not scare him; it challenges him.

He is a master of small-unit tactics and knows the field manuals. He always uses terrain boards and poncho terrain models — he keeps a cigar box full of mud-caked miniature combat vehicles for impromptu terrain discussions. In fact, he can make a boring tactical exercise come to life using a makeshift terrain model of four rocks and three handfuls of mud.

He knows how to study a map, identify the enemy's likely avenue of approach, and alter his portion of the

plan if the situation warrants it.

He knows the enemy beyond the simple identification of vehicle exteriors and the tactical formations of the first echelon. He understands the depth and the purpose of how he will fight. He knows that victory belongs to the side that knows the most about itself and the other side as well.

He makes sure his standard operating procedures are useful and well understood. They are not lock-step procedures, just good battle drills. His people don't have to be briefed on what actions they should take upon contact, when crossing danger areas, or when attacked by chemical agents. These are second nature to his soldiers.

He understands his role in the broad scheme of things and understands the importance of his independence on the modern battlefield.

He knows how to cope with stress because he knows it can be just as debilitating as a gunshot wound or a shrapnel fragment. He understands that battle stress parallels the intensity of the battle; that for every ten soldiers killed or wounded in action he can expect up to eight stress casualties. He prepares his soldier to cope with this reality, too, and treats these psychological casualties much the same as he treats his externally wounded soldiers.

He prepares his soldiers to cope, too, *before* the battle



begins. He understands that morale, cohesion, and esprit significantly affect the unit's ability to manage stress on the battlefield. He also understands that his self-confidence (the trust he generates) is important to that process. (He is a proactive leader.)

He can deal with the ambiguous situations on the battlefield, process bits and pieces of information, make sound judgments, and act correctly. He's great with puzzles and good at painting a mental picture around an idea.

He learns from his mistakes. (He does make mistakes, but is not terrified by failure. He thrives on the challenge and understands that setbacks are to be capitalized upon.)

In short, this ideal independent battle leader is a model soldier, a soldier's soldier. His soldiers look upon him as the example. He's mentally tough and physically fit. He goes where his soldiers go, eats what they eat, and expects no more from them than he expects of himself.

He is committed to the unit mission. He has captured the aggressiveness Civil War Admiral David Farragut showed in his famous "Damn the torpedoes! Full speed ahead!" As far as he is concerned, the war will be won or lost on the basis of how well his unit fulfills its assigned missions.

The leader who fits this description is a tough guy to beat. But how does a commander go about instilling in his junior leaders the characteristics that will turn them into confident, decisive, creative, aggressive, and independent leaders such as this? The following is my advice:

First, keep your goal in mind and find a way to make things happen that will lead to building independence in small-unit leaders. Then, adopt a philosophy that will show these leaders that you are serious about it.

Do not clutter your thinking with the many reasons why you can't do training that builds skill in autonomy. Rather, focus your attention on that goal and begin to look for opportunities to achieve it. Stay open-minded, too. Don't restrict yourself to conventional approaches; some of the most outlandish ideas can lead to exciting and effective training in independence. Focus outwardly as you search for such ideas and training opportunities.

If you really look, you will find that there are many opportunities to build the skills that are critical for independent small-unit operations.

- Track swimming.
- Border augmentation.
- Survival training.
- Escape and evasion training.
- River crossing exercises.
- Combat in cities (including subterranean operations).

The second part of my advice — adopting an "independent leader" philosophy — includes making sure your subordinates understand that you expect them to take the initiative and to be aggressive and creative. Reward them when they do.

This means also providing them with the resources they will need to support independent operations. Budget these resources and force the issue with your staff if you have to.

Avoid centralized training, but check on the appropriate tasks, conditions, and standards. Establish training priorities based on your mission and the critical tasks. Although centralized training is often the best way to use resources, it is generally not the best way to build independence. But remember: If you do focus on your objective of building independence, you may find your unit stretched in twice as many directions as it is now. This is not necessarily bad, if you are getting the right kind of results. And if you reward independence, that's what you will get.

Keep things as simple as possible. Focus on doing the manageable rather than the cumbersome. Although independent operations can become complex, they usually succeed if the basics are done well. Any time you see that your guidance is not being followed, find out why it is not.

Stabilize small units as much as you can; this will facilitate your training efforts and will protect the foundation of your independence-building process. And make your training tough and challenging — your soldiers deserve (and want) the kind of tough training that stretches and prepares them for active combat.

Make certain your unit does not lack the fabric of discipline, because its survival on a future battlefield may well depend on a mature degree of individual and group discipline.

Strongly encourage the direction and momentum of efforts that should lead to the desired result, and keep your junior leaders headed in that direction. Keep pumping clear direction and energy into the unit.

Finally, emphasize the development of loyalty and trust up and down the chain of command. Always set the example and insist that your subordinate leaders reciprocate in kind. After all, this is our profession's lifeblood.

Not just commanders, but all of us throughout the Army should encourage our small-unit leaders to find new ways of building independence. We should be instrumental in getting them out of garrison into the field to learn to know themselves, to face the challenge of thinking for themselves, and to expand their horizons beyond the unit's borders. In short, we must teach them resourcefulness.

Once we begin to do these things we will build morale, cohesion, and esprit in our units and confidence in our junior leaders. All these qualities lead to successful autonomous operations on the modern battlefield.



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# TRAINING NOTES



## NET

LIEUTENANT COLONEL ROBERT L. FRIEDRICH

When a mechanized infantry battalion is scheduled to undergo Bradley new equipment training (NET), its everyday world changes from that day on. It may be helpful to the people in battalions that have this experience before them to look at the way another unit — the 2d Battalion, 41st Infantry, 2d Armored Division — went about dealing with these changes in its everyday world.

New equipment training on the Bradley includes more than just training on the equipment. The Bradley itself presents a significant challenge because it is more complex than the M113. The fact that the infantryman, in many situations, can now fight mounted all the way to the objective is also a new concept. In fact, all the changes the Bradley brings about work together to catapult today's mechanized infantryman into the Army of tomorrow.

The Bradley infantryman not only must continue to master the basic infantry skills, he must also master the skills required of a tank commander, which includes learning to effectively employ a vehicle equipped with cannon, missile, machinegun, rifles, and soldiers as part of a fighting system. It is this requirement, to marry the skills of two combat arms, more than any other, that makes the coming of the Bradley so significant and new equipment training so important.

NET actually starts long before the first day of training on the vehicle, and as in many other endeavors, the success of that training will depend largely upon the planning and preparation that precedes it. The planning requirements include the primary functional areas of personnel, logistics, and training (operations).

First, the battalion has to be converted to the Division 86 structure under the "J" Series MTOE. The addition of a fourth line company, the consolidation of various assets into the headquarters company, and the consolidation of all the Improved TOW Vehicles (ITVs) into the new Company E must all be planned for and executed quickly. Although this is not a great challenge internally, the overall effect of developing a headquarters company larger than that of some battalions, along with the attendant turmoil in personnel and logistics, does constitute a challenge.

In the case of our battalion (and the 1st Battalion, 41st Infantry as well), we were brought up above 100 percent MTOE strength in 11B and 63T soldiers (in preparation for training them as 11Ms and 63T D3s). But this was not the case in several other key MOSs (64C, 19D), and this created a requirement for the battalion to cross train 11Bs to fill these vacancies. We first decided to fill most of the 64C slots with short-term soldiers who

were either leaving the service or were going to units not equipped with the Bradley. We then filled the 64C slots that were still vacant with 11Bs who would also have to be trained as 11Ms, even while they performed their 64C primary duties.

This solution was not without its difficulties. Our conscious decision to fill the support platoon with short-term soldiers created a recurrent problem of turnover that could be resolved only with the influx of the required number of 64Cs. In addition, the 11B soldiers we had to assign to fill the vacancies in the scout platoon had to be trained on the Bradley to earn the 11M MOS. But this requirement to fill the scout platoon took away soldiers from the rifle platoons. The influx of excess 63Ts also posed unique problems.

Although the battalion was filled to 120 percent, this fill was mainly with Skill Level 1 soldiers direct from advanced individual training (AIT). Although these soldiers were well trained in their basic skills, they had neither the experience nor the rank required by the NET team for training. Therefore, we selected a number of high quality junior soldiers who could fill positions as NCOs on maintenance teams and who would therefore be eligible to receive the total system training normally given to NCOs.

This balancing of available re-



sources against increased requirements was a deliberate effort on our part, and it is something that all battalions converting to the Bradley system will have to face. In my opinion, this situation must be managed at the battalion level, because only there are its full effects felt, and only there can the inability of the personnel system to meet the stated requirements be addressed effectively.

Another personnel consideration that these battalions have to think about most carefully is the selection of vehicle teams. Although it may not appear that the battalions themselves can affect this process, they can, and they must, if they are to be successful.

Our battalion, in selecting vehicle team members (drivers, gunners, and vehicle commanders), used those physical and mental criteria we thought would produce successful crews — marksmanship scores, GT and CO (combat operations) scores, and the results of the gunner's physical exam. In the case of drivers, we let the company commanders use their own discretion in selecting good soldiers who had demonstrated the required mental quickness and mechanical aptitude. But the Bradley commanders and the gunners had to be selected according to our own stringent set of guidelines. For example, they had to have scored high Sharpshooter (27 or higher) on the tunnel "C" target, or Expert on a field firing range. We felt that there was a direct correlation between the abilities soldiers demonstrated in their rifle marksmanship training and those required for target acquisition, sight alignment, and firing adjustments with the Bradley.

We also established a standard GT score of 100 or higher for the commanders and gunners, thereby ensuring that the soldiers selected would be among the top 50 percent of all the soldiers in the Army. We used the CO score because it was the only test regularly given to soldiers that had any relationship to the manual skills (psychomotor abilities) required to employ the Bradley. Finally, we used the results of the gunner's physical

exam to ensure that our gunners were not color blind (especially in the red spectrum, which would limit their use of the thermal sights) and that they would be able to withstand the increased tension associated with gunnery.

Because of the limited number of NCOs initially available in the battalion to be Bradley commanders (BCs), our criteria could not be fully implemented when it came time to select BCs. Our selection of gunners however, was based solely on the criteria, regardless of rank. As a result, all but one of the BC/gunner teams remained constant throughout the training. (We had to replace one gunner during pre-gunnery training and he was not awarded the 11M MOS.)

By the end of our training program we had qualified 53 of our 54 crews. While this could be attributed partly to the training we gave our soldiers, we also feel that our method of selecting crews had a definite effect on the final results. Thus, it seems to us that other battalions that are going to take on the Bradley should establish specific crew selection criteria and follow through on the selection process. It also indicates that personnel managers at all levels must improve their selection methods when they are called on to assign soldiers to Bradley-equipped battalions.

## LOGISTICS

The logistical challenges associated with pre-NET requirements, needless to say, also have to be accomplished with precision, and most of them require a long lead time to resolve.

For one thing, the current configuration of facilities that are normally available to an "H" Series battalion does not meet Division 86 requirements. The space needed to house a sixth company, for instance, will probably exceed the available resources. This means that planning must be done early to provide motor pool space for maintenance and parking for 31 more (and larger) vehicles and for office space, arms rooms, and

all other areas required for the normal life support of the unit.

These logistical problems can loom even larger because of the need to turn in equipment and to accept a large amount of new equipment. All of these tasks must be accomplished before training starts if commanders are to concentrate on the training itself, and the battalions must monitor their own needs closely and make their higher headquarters aware of those needs.

## TRAINING ASPECTS

As for the training aspects of the pre-NET program, these should be designed to ensure that the required infantry skills are maintained during the period between the turn-in of the M113s and the receipt of the Bradleys. Infantry battalions have an advantage over armor units in this regard since most basic infantry skills are not dependent on vehicles. Thus, individual and crew-served weapons training, EIB training and testing, CTT/SQT training, airmobile training, and other interesting and productive events can be programmed. In short, the basic skills required to support Bradley training and to pass the pre-NET diagnostic test should form the basis of unit training during this period.

This pre-NET period is also the time to analyze the training opportunities in the basic NET program provided by Fort Benning. Although the upcoming NET will be supported and structured by resources external to the battalion, its successful accomplishment will be the responsibility of the battalion itself, and specific plans must be made well ahead of time.

A quick review of the basic NET schedule will show that on 27 of the 37 days allocated to NET, training other than that specific to new equipment training can be conducted. On several of these days, for example, Skill Level 1 soldiers will not be actively involved in NET, and they can use the time available to train on other required infantry skills.

The procedure we used called for identifying those periods when training would be possible and then for providing guidance to the companies on the minimum training they should plan to do. The companies themselves then selected periods when they would accomplish the given tasks. Thus, the soldiers were kept active, the basic chain of command relationships were maintained, and the unit was given an opportunity to experience the rigors of sustaining itself throughout the fielding of the Bradley.

Although a NET team might suggest that certain training be eliminated during NET to lessen its effect on the program itself, units should not be overly cautious. The cancellation of training in the basic requirements during NET can effect the long range capabilities of the unit and will certainly result in the loss of many training opportunities. With too many restrictions, in fact, the Skill Level 1 soldiers will not be productively employed and their ensuing boredom could lead to other problems.

Certainly, any unit scheduled to undergo NET will find it a busy time, but many other tasks that support the overall requirements can still be done. When they are, unit pride, morale, and training readiness will increase.

### **THREE PARTS**

New equipment training itself is divided into three parts — leader training, organizational maintenance training (OMNET), and operator's training (OPNET). Leader training is the key to all the rest, and all leaders must attend, because it gives a unit's leaders, from squad level up, an opportunity to become acquainted with the Bradley before their soldiers begin their training. Schedules can be worked out with the NET team so that the leaders from the individual companies can attend in two or more sessions, which will allow them to maintain their normal unit functions.

The organizational maintenance NET is conducted in two sessions of two parts each (hull and turret), and it

produces some of the best trained mechanics in the Army today.

A unit undergoing NET needs to structure its training cycle so that the first OMNET session conducted is heavily weighted with NCOs. Overall, OMNET provides a maximum number of soldiers trained in both hull and turret maintenance as well as a maximum number of supervisors who can help the NET team develop a strong maintenance base to support the system.

The one drawback to OMNET is the space it requires — eight maintenance bays and some office space. The dedication of this amount of space at a time when the battalion itself is probably restructuring and reorganizing itself undoubtedly will be inconvenient, which means that it must be well planned. The overall benefit, though, is well worth the temporary inconvenience.

The next phase, OPNET, is the heart and soul of Bradley NET. In it 11B infantrymen are trained to be 11M fighting vehicle infantrymen. It is this part of the training program that involves most of the battalion's personnel and presents the greatest challenge to the unit. More important, OPNET provides an opportunity for the unit to establish a program, set standards, and develop techniques that will be the basis for all future Bradley training.

The basis for OPNET in the 2d Battalion, 41st Infantry was referred to as Total System Training, a combination of Bradley-specific skills and basic infantry skills. This training was designed to challenge the unit to sustain its level of training while adding to it the skills required of Bradley infantrymen. Our rationale for this approach was simple and straightforward: We knew that a Bradley battalion would add between 24 and 36 days of vehicle and gunnery training to its already full annual program. Unless an integrated, multi-echelon program was developed early there would be a danger that the unit would follow two separate tracks — one infantry, the other gunnery. To do this would negate the synergistic effects of

the Bradley, for it is most powerful when it functions as an integrated system.

Our combination of requirements and tasks proved successful, and we functioned on several levels simultaneously. The NCOs carried a large part of the load, but they were aided by a number of Skill Level 1 soldiers. These were the soldiers who had the most time to commit to concurrent training, and they demonstrated skills normally associated with soldiers beyond their level of experience.

Having soldiers in the ranks of Specialist-4 and below conduct an M16 qualification range is not always desirable, for they will not normally have the experience that provides for good training. But because of the energy of the NET itself and the desire and abilities of our young soldiers, they conducted several such ranges, all of which produced outstanding results. Our squad MILES exercises, SQT training, and battle drills met with similar results.

With the right kind of planning, then, companies can accomplish much more than will be required of them during NET and sustain their basic skills at the same time.

It is interesting to note that when our units returned to doing their common ARTEP tasks, we found that we had to make a concerted effort to include Bradley-specific skills in our training program. If we had not conducted total system training during NET, this all-too-obvious fact may have escaped us.

Another factor to be considered in planning and executing OPNET is the standardization of training. A NET team consists of five different sets of company trainers who align themselves with the companies and the scouts. Each team is headed by a captain and consists of one NCO trainer per vehicle and an NCOIC. The NCOs in our NET team were hand-picked for the job and had extensive experience. Each team also had a unique personality, as does any organization. This factor, combined with the fact that training was done successively, dictated that standards be set and



adhered to if a minimal level of training was to be met. (This is a unit problem, and because the battalion commander and his S3 must also undergo training, their ability to oversee the training as they normally would is limited.)

Innovation and inventiveness during training, as always, should be encouraged. But the training needs to be closely monitored to ensure that errors made early (because of poor selection of training areas, perhaps, or because of limited resources) do not continue throughout the training cycle. Likewise, any innovations must be monitored to see that the basic levels of training are being met and that the training is not being modified to fit something that is unique to the personality of either the NET team or the company being trained.

One solution to this problem is to provide a good system for passing information from the lead team on to those that follow. This should include such steps as documenting the training courses established by the lead company (driver's course, BSEC course, range sequence) and formally passing this knowledge from one team to the next. The lack of any ARTEP-type training and evaluation outlines (T&EOs) for NET makes this documentation even more critical as the unit blends NET with its training facilities and its training personality.

We used several other techniques during our OPNET. The first of these was the Dry-Wet-Wet approach to gunnery. Each crew conducted all exercises at least three times — first dry (without fire), then twice with ammunition. As the lead vehicles conduct their live fire runs, other vehicles would follow in a dry status and would simulate firing. This not only saved time, it increased the time crews had for training and provided a sequence of steps through which they could develop their expertise.

Directly related to this were our after-action reviews of each run, during which each crew and its squad trainer discussed the crew's performance on the previous run. Any crew weaknesses this review identified were

corrected with additional off-line training or through the use of the coaxial machinegun as a subcaliber device to hone a gunner's skills. We also found that the basic skills of identifying targets, handing the target off from the vehicle commander to the gunner, and engaging a target within the allotted time could be greatly improved through this subcaliber training. (In our experience, if a crew could acquire a target, hand it off, and fire its first burst within five to eight seconds, a successful engagement was almost assured.)

We also made a concerted effort to allow the assistant squad leaders and the assistant gunners to fire the 25mm gun. By doing so, we built depth into the program. This technique is suggested by FM 23-1 (Test) and, while slightly difficult to carry out, we considered it necessary training. Where ammunition is critical, in fact, subcaliber runs can be very productive.

### **PLATOON LIVE FIRE**

The NET program calls for a platoon live fire exercise as the final gunnery event. Serious consideration needs to be given to this requirement by all units, for it is probably too big a step for a unit to take at this stage of its training. The requirement to fire as an integrated element without an opportunity to train for it tactically off the range militates against attempting the exercise. It is a decision that individual commanders must make.

The range requirements for NET should be planned thoroughly. Using only two ranges was not a decision of choice, in our case, and it caused enough difficulty to warrant comment. Ranges for the Bradley must run the gamut from subcaliber to full caliber with dismounted infantrymen aggressively executing their role. Two ranges will work, of course, but the cost in congestion alone for the units makes this an undesirable solution. The best overall solution is to use three ranges for training.

The design and operation of the ranges must also be considered.

Although the NET team acts to certify that ranges meet the standards set forth in FM 23-1 (Test), range design is a unit responsibility. Unfortunately, it is also an inherent weakness in today's infantry. What a Bradley unit has to do is to set up a range similar to a tank range, getting support and advice from a sister tank battalion. (Tankers have been doing this for years and have developed successful SOPs and techniques that will make the design and operation of a Bradley range much easier.) But the infantrymen assigned to Bradley units also need to be trained in range design and operations, and the Infantry School might begin to develop some special training courses on the subject.

There is a potential danger in a battalion's operation of the ranges, and that is the tendency to lean heavily on its new Company E as a detail company for the line units. Without question, this is a simple and direct solution that has little effect on the training unit, but it does not consider the fact that Company E also needs to train.

During our NET, our companies spent six days on each of the two ranges. During the initial three days on the first range, our scouts, who had undergone NET earlier, provided the range support. The units supported themselves during the next three days. The same was true for the second range, with Company E providing support only for the first three days. The result was that the supporting elements were able to train and the line companies learned more by being self-sufficient.

When we finished our NET, our squads were trained to fight with the Bradley, and our soldiers had sustained their basic infantry skills as well. The battalion's success was attributable to good planning, strong support from an excellent NET structure, and superb execution by the soldiers.

We learned many lessons. The most significant one was that good planning, as in any endeavor, makes execution simpler. Another was that pre-gunnery training needs to be used

more and that immediate remedial training for sub-standard crews is a must.

After-action reviews highlight strengths, define weaknesses, and resolve problems as they occur. The NET team is a particularly valuable resource in this process and should be used as much as possible. The coaxial machinegun should also be used more

as a subcaliber device, coupled with the Dry-Wet-Wet approach, because it develops skills early and provides an inexpensive means of multiplying training opportunities.

Finally, the implementation of a total systems approach forms a solid base upon which a unit can build while bringing into the Army the most revolutionary piece of equipment in

the history of the Infantry — the Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle.

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# NTC: Command and Control

**MAJOR VERNON W. HUMPHREY**

Throughout this series of articles on the training being conducted at the National Training Center, weak command and control has been shown to be a common shortcoming in almost all units.\*

For the purpose of analyzing the problem, I have divided command and control into two major areas: battlefield leadership and battlefield management. "Leadership" is defined here as "getting people to do things," and "management" as "arranging matters so that things are done efficiently."

Battlefield leadership, as I use the term, is a process in which a leader fills two roles: that of a leader and that of a follower.

In his role as leader he must know how to assess a situation and his mission and then how to develop plans that are within his unit's ability to execute and that will lead to mission accomplishment. In short, the leader must know his tactical responsibilities.

He must also be able to communicate — to express his desires and

explain his standards to his subordinates so that they have a thorough understanding of his plan and the way he wants it executed. Then he must supervise the plan, making sure all parts of it are carried out on time and to his standards.

In his role as a follower, the leader must be proficient in all the hard skills necessary to carry out the tasks he is assigned. He must implement the plans of his leader, not by slavishly following orders but by knowing and understanding the intent of the leader and by trying to bring about the desired outcome.

The follower must also keep his leader informed of situations that may impede the execution of the plan; accordingly, he must recommend actions and request permission to deviate from the plan if he believes it is necessary to accomplish the mission.

## FAILURES

In general, experience at the National Training Center indicates that leaders fall down on two of their tasks as leaders — communicating plans to their subordinates and supervising the plans' execution. These leaders often assume that their

responsibilities end when they issue their orders.

As followers, their failures often result from the fact that they have not been given much latitude and responsibility during their training programs back at their home stations. All too often at the NTC, junior leaders and soldiers do things they know are inappropriate because they "were ordered to do it." They do not feel that they have the latitude to make the on-the-spot adjustments a situation may demand.

At all levels, subordinates frequently fail to report accurately, to make recommendations, and to request or suggest changes in a plan. Often the unit is "roped in" by such restrictions as boundaries and limits on reconnaissance, things that could (and would) have been changed if higher headquarters had known of the difficulties they presented.

Subordinates seem to lack a sense of responsibility, too, and there is often little pressure *upward* for instructions, assistance and support. Leaders seem to be satisfied with this situation, so the result is a two-way breakdown in communication.

Aside from battlefield leadership, there is also battlefield management, which includes planning, preparation, and execution. In the planning

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*\*This is the sixth in a series. The views expressed are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Department of Defense or any element of it.*



phase, the first phase of any operation, commanders and leaders must give clear guidance and must issue orders *on the ground* wherever possible. Not only must they issue orders, they must also *explain* the operation, going over possible enemy reactions, actions at critical junctures, and alternate schemes of fire and maneuver depending on what the enemy might do. The aim is for key subordinates at each level to understand the plan and the commander's intentions as thoroughly as his leaders do. An excellent technique for improving leader communication is to require briefbacks from subordinates on their plans.

The succession of command also must be planned for before the battle begins — *who* will take command, *how* he will take command, and *under what circumstances* he will do it — and everyone must thoroughly understand these plans. Many units assume the XO will take command if the commander is killed or otherwise taken out of action. There's nothing wrong with this, but whoever is to take command must:

- Be physically located so he can take command immediately. (He can't be five or ten kilometers back with the trains.)

- Be fully aware of the terrain and the friendly and enemy situation. (He has to have seen and heard the same things the commander saw and heard, without the distractions of having to solve logistical and administrative problems.)

- Have a command vehicle with good communications. (If the commander was killed in a tank or an APC, how long will the *new* commander survive in a jeep?)

If the battalion XO is to assume command, then, he must be a *combat* XO, not a chief of staff or trains supervisor. If the S3 is to take command, he must keep up with the battle and move with the action. At company level, the choice is between the XO and the senior platoon leader, with the same considerations.

In the preparation phase, vehicles must be rearmed and topped off, range markers put out, fighting posi-

RESPONSIBLE	AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY	ORIENTATION	SUPERVISE	WATCH FOR
S1	Casualties and replacements.	Rear to front for replacements. Front to rear for casualties.	Medical platoon, PAC.	No incoming casualties during action; no reports.
S2	Intelligence, reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance.	Forward	Scout platoon, GSR, patrols.	Lack of reports during operations; no patrol plan from units; no info from patrols.
S3	Operations and plans.	Forward	Maneuver units and combat support attachments.	Inadequate preparation for operations, plans not in synch with OPOD.
S4	Rearming, refueling, and resupply. Recovery and repair.	Rear to front	Support platoon, maintenance platoon.	No reports of loss in action. No damaged vehicles in repair. Ammo not broken down for quick issue.
FSO	Fire support.	Forward	FIST teams, mortars.	Lack of company fire support plans; units not calling for fire in action; poor use of mortars. Target info not being passed to S2/S3.
Engineer officer	Breaching and installing obstacles and minefields.	Forward	Engineer platoon.	Lack of mobility/plans. Readiness of engineers to execute plans.
ADA NCO	ADA Support.	Forward	Redeye/stinger teams.	Lack of ADA plans; priority areas not covered.
FAC	CAS, TAC Air, JAAT.	Forward	Air support assets.	Lack of air support plans; coordination between artillery and air.
DUTIES OF THE STAFF IN COMBAT				

tions prepared, and all the other steps necessary for the coming operation carried out. Assistants must be used intelligently to supervise these actions. Staff officers, XOs, sergeants major, first sergeants, and platoon sergeants should be assigned specific areas to inspect and report on during the preparation phase of the mission.

In the execution phase, the leader must keep abreast of the situation and constantly issue fragmentary orders and directions to control the action as it develops. As the saying goes, "No plan survives contact," and leaders must be prepared to improvise once contact is made.

The first step in improving battlefield management is to streamline the tactical operations center (TOC). As we have seen in previous articles in

this series, the TOC is usually ineffective — left behind in the attack and overrun in the defense or the delay. And no wonder! The typical TOC at the NTC consists of a group of several large vehicles linked together through cumbersome extensions, covered with an enormous net, and surrounded by smaller vehicles, ration boxes, and sleeping soldiers.

The TOC doesn't have to be that big and clumsy. Impediments such as coffee pots and huge charts and graphs mounted on sheets of plywood aren't necessary. Except for the communications equipment, everything a battalion TOC needs can be put into a single canvas mapcase — a plastic-encased map, some pencils, and a notebook with the various charts and graphs.

Fundamentally, the TOC is a message center. It should serve as a focal point for the staff, a place through which information flows, and from which orders and information are disseminated. To be effective, a TOC must be near the scene of the action. If it's too far from the battle, its occupants can't communicate well and soon find themselves isolated.

## STAFF

Along the same line, another thing a leader needs for good battlefield management is a good staff. We have long recognized the need for a commander to "see the battlefield," to visualize the totality of friendly and enemy combat, combat support, and combat service support dispositions and activity. But a commander cannot do this alone — he has only one pair of eyes. Nor can he alone supervise the planning, preparation, and execution stages of an operation. Accordingly, he has been given a staff to assist him, each member of which should have specific supervisory responsibilities. Each should also actively seek the information his commander needs to fight the battle.

With the TOC serving as a message center, the staff members are free to go out and actively supervise their areas of responsibility, which are outlined on the accompanying chart.

Formations can also be an aid to command and control. Unfortunately,

ly, though, too many units use formations as a substitute for effective command and control measures. Leaders must remember that formations alone do not provide security. Bounding overwatch, the use of cover and concealment, and seeing the enemy first provide security. But units that concentrate on their formations tend not to use bounding overwatch well because it messes up the formation. They do not use cover and concealment well because they don't want to lose visual contact with their base elements. As a result, the enemy usually sees them first and can accurately estimate the location of those elements he cannot see.

Another way a commander can maintain control is to balance his dispositions. This means that the commander must control the physical deployment and movement of his unit in such a way that it can react to any likely enemy threat or action. He does this by ensuring that some portion of the unit is initially unengaged and can be maneuvered and committed to tip the outcome of the battle. This unengaged unit, of course, is the reserve.

The reserve may not be formally assigned in the commander's operations order. In fact, each element in the command may assume the reserve role at any time, depending on the need. The key is that the commander holds the reserve under his own control and moves it to the place where it can be committed most effectively. He may move the reserve several

times before committing it, or he may simultaneously commit his reserve unit and assign another unit the reserve role. The commander must think at least two steps ahead — "Where should I commit my reserve, and what should I plan to do after that?"

Balanced dispositions can also be improved by realistic and flexible plans that also maintain security.

The aim of all good command and control measures is to help the commander keep his fighting elements firmly under his thumb and to maneuver them rapidly and effectively in a fluid situation. To do this, he needs to devote his full attention to the problem. Therefore, his subordinates must be trained to deal with all other matters that affect the command without making excessive demands on the commander's time and attention. At the same time, they must also be alert to the things the commander needs to know to control the battle and then see that he is informed of these things.

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## MOTTOES ON FRONT COVER BELONG TO THESE REGIMENTS

(All units are Infantry, except as noted.)

Line 1: 15th; 25th & 377th; 29th; 136th; 504th. Line 2: 16th & 24th; 137th; 141st; 505th. Line 3: 160th & 502d; 159th; 30th; 31st. Line 4: 35th; 327th & 516th; 9th; 37th. Line 5: 38th; 39th. Line 6: 161st; 47th; 168th. Line 7: 153d, 184th, 324th, 325th & 404th; 187th; 8th; 7th & 319th. Line 8: 242d; 6th; 293d; 50th. Line 9: 48th; 75th; 23d; 297th; 58th. Line 10: 69th & 165th; 51st; 52d. Line 11: 41st; 5th; 22d & 36th; 1st. Line 12: 318th; 4th, 369th & 376th; 10th. Line 13: 60th; 339th; 140th. Line 14: 61st; 87th; 501st. Line 15: 13th; 14th; 188th; 503d. Line 16: 115th; 26th; 145th. Line 17: 2d & 3d; 19th; 397th. Line 18: 27th; 17th; 121st. Line 19: 414th; 506th; 199th & 344th. Line 20: 508th; 20th; 5th Cav. Line 21: 124th; 18th; 71st. Line 22: 442d; 509th; 28th; 102d. Line 23: 511th; 103d & 135th; 109th. Line 24: 117th; 130th, 147th & 351st; 148th; 151st. Line 25: 156th; 166th, 306th & 385th; 176th; 181st. Line 26: 225th & 425th; 54th; 127th & 128th; 21st. Line 27: 104th & 314th; 107th; 108th. Line 28: 120th; 144th; 155th; 119th. Line 29: 178th; 105th; 174th. Line 30: 110th; 142d. Line 31: 111th; 143d; 162d; 134th. Line 32: 114th & 179th; 182d; 116th & 308th. Line 33: 200th; 118th; 123d. Line 34: 122d; 125th; 126th. Line 35: 33d; 12th; 34th & 408th. (Source: INFANTRY REGIMENTS OF THE US ARMY, by James A. Sawicki. Dumfries, Virginia: Wyvern Publications, 1981.)



# ENLISTED CAREER NOTES



## PROMOTION BOARD RESULTS

It may be helpful to the staff sergeants who were considered for promotion by the latest board to know how they stacked up against other staff sergeants. (Other NCOs as well may learn something from the results.)

The panel reviewed 5,751 files (2,261 in the primary zone and 3,490 in the secondary zone) and found 15 percent of them (893) "fully qualified." ("Fully qualified" means that if there were enough allocations, all the soldiers in this category would have been selected for promotion.) Approximately 4.2 percent (82) of the staff sergeants who were *not* selected from the primary zone were considered fully qualified, and more than 22.3 percent (733) from the secondary zone.

There were several points of special concern to the board:

**Weight control and physical fitness.** The board placed a great deal of emphasis on verifying physical fitness and weight control data. Disparities were often found among the figures recorded on DA Form 2-1 (Block 22); on the soldier's certifying statement in his promotion packet (which he signs and his MILPO sends to Fort Benjamin Harrison); and on his Enlisted Evaluation Report (EER). (Raters and indorsers must do a better job of seeing that this data is reflected on a soldier's EER and that it is consistent with other documentation on that soldier.)

The panel members had considerable doubt about the validity of this data when they received EERs on which "white-out" correction fluid had been used on the height/weight data and also in the narrative, especially when the soldier's photograph reflected something different or when

the photograph was missing altogether. It is important to note that if a soldier was identified as being overweight by either DA Form 2-1, his photograph, or his certifying statement (and without supporting documentation such as pinch-test results), he was not selected for advancement no matter how competitive his record may have been.

A total of 197 soldiers (8.7 percent) in the primary zone and 214 (6.1 percent) in the secondary zone (or a total of 411 staff sergeants in CMF 11) were identified as being overweight. Many of these might otherwise have been selected for promotion.

**Qualitative Management Program (QMP).** The panel identified 205 staff sergeants for referral to the selection board for final QMP consideration. The referrals were based on poor performance in repetitive assignments, a history of disciplinary problems, or extremely poor physical fitness.

**Training and education.** Military education (MOS-related and leadership training such as the Advanced NCO Course) and the lack of such schooling were heavily considered in the selection process. The NCO Development Program, in most cases, provided the necessary leadership training and the improved job performance required for advancement.

SQT scores were lower than expected and in many cases were missing entirely. Commanders should ensure that their soldiers are tested and that the results are recorded appropriately. It is up to the soldier himself to see that his latest SQT score is in his official file (that Forms 2A and 2-1 are forwarded to the Board).

**Utilization and assignment.** "Easy" jobs and repetitive non-leadership assignments are very poor criteria for promotion. True, some

soldiers can't help being placed in such positions, but for the most part, after a period of time, they can ask through their chains of command to be released so they can serve in leadership positions.

If there is such a thing as a secret to getting promoted, it is probably diversity in assignments throughout a soldier's career, especially in leadership positions such as squad leader or platoon sergeant. This, along with assignments such as drill sergeant, recruiter, and operations sergeant (among others), will round out his professional development and show the panel that he is capable of performing in a variety of important leadership assignments.

With all of these considerations in mind, here are some recommendations to any soldier who wants to make the most of his opportunities for promotion:

- Check your microfiche at least once a year, and keep it up to date.

- Don't just *sign* your promotion packet; ensure that all the information on DA Forms 2A and 2-1 is updated and accurate (assignments, SQT scores, and the like).

- Ensure that your uniform, as shown in your photograph, is in accordance with regulations. (Promotion boards now use the hard-copy photographs.)

- Maintain a high degree of physical fitness and weight control. If you are having trouble doing so, seek help through your chain of command. Don't put yourself in the group that is "fully qualified" but not selected because of fitness or weight.

- Attend ANCOC at the earliest possible date if you are selected, even if you are an SFC/PSG or a promotable SSG. ANCOC attendance helps for promotion to SFC/PSG and it will also help for promotion to

MSG/1SG.

- Seek assignments to TO&E troop leadership positions.

## **EARLY PROMOTIONS TO PV2**

Early promotions to Private-2 are in store for outstanding basic training graduates and one-station unit training students.

Army Training Center commanders can now promote up to three percent of BT graduates and OSUT trainees (both active duty and Reserve Component) in their eighth week of training. Commanders can grant these promotions without regard to the normal six months time-in-service requirement for advancement to PV2.

The early promotions are for "truly outstanding soldiers who demonstrate leadership potential, motivation, teamwork, and a positive attitude," according to a TRADOC message.

## **REENLISTMENT STANDARDS**

Mid-term soldiers who fail to meet the new reenlistment trainability standards won't be permitted to reenlist. They will be restricted to extension only until they attain eligibility through re-testing on the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery or the Skill Qualification Test (SQT). Their enlistments can be extended up to 1 April 1985, but not beyond that date.

After a soldier has been re-tested and has met the mid-term criteria, three actions are possible:

- If he is within the eligibility window for reenlistment (within three months of his normal separation date), he may reenlist in any option for which he qualifies.
- If he is not within the eligibility window, a previous extension can be cancelled and he may then reenlist for any option for which he is otherwise qualified. He will receive credit for in-the-window reenlistment provided the extension cancellation is processed through the standard instal-

lation division personnel system before the reenlistment is processed.

- A selective reenlistment bonus (SRB) is authorized in SRB MOSs if all conditions required for payment have been met. But any time remaining on an extension is considered previously obligated service, and bonus money is not paid for that period.

Any questions concerning these new criteria should be directed to local retention NCOs.

## **RESERVE COMPONENT NOTES**

### **PA TRAINING SUSPENDED**

Beginning with the Fiscal Year 1985 classes, the selection of USAR soldiers to participate in the Army's Physician Assistant (PA) Training Program will be suspended.

This suspension is based upon the overstrength in physician assistants now assigned to Army Reserve units and upon the limited funds available to support the program's extended periods of resident training.

Army Reservists now in PA training and those scheduled to enter training in August 1984 are not affected by this change.

### **TRAINING FOR CS AND CSS SPECIALTIES**

Enrollment applications for some 115 primary and basic technical courses are being accepted from soldiers in the combat support and combat service support specialties.

Commanders should nominate qualified soldiers for courses beginning in Fiscal Year 1985 within 30 days after they are placed on a promotion list. The course will help these soldiers qualify for the next higher skill level in each of their primary MOSs.

First priority for acceptance in the

primary course will go to soldiers who have been selected for promotion to SGT/SP5. Soldiers in the rank of CPL/SP4 who are serving in SGT/SP5 positions for which the training is necessary will be given secondary consideration.

Soldiers who have been selected for promotion to SSG/SP6 will also be given secondary consideration if they are now serving in SSG/SP6 positions for which the training is necessary.

Soldiers may request the course either "tour of duty enroute" or "TDY and return."

Soldiers who complete the courses incur a six-month service obligation.

## **PERSONNEL REGULATIONS**

Two Army personnel regulations are especially critical for U.S. Army Reservists — AR 140-10, which deals with the removal of enlisted soldiers from active status and AR 135-205, which explains the Qualitative Retention Program.

Under AR 140-10, SGMs/CSMs who have completed 35 years of service, MSGs/1SGs who have 32 years, or SFCs/PSGs who have 30 years must be removed from active status. This policy applies only to unit members who have completed 20 years of qualifying service for retired pay.

A continuing program of qualitative retention (AR 135-205) is essential for the progression of qualified enlisted personnel at proper intervals in their careers.

The objectives of the retention program are to see that only the best qualified soldiers are retained beyond 20 years to fill the comparatively few senior NCO positions.

Reservists should also know about the Reserve Component Personnel and Administration Center's (RCPAC) Pamphlet 140-9 entitled "Continuing Military Service in the USAR After 20 Years." This pamphlet provides information on the benefits, privileges, and advantages of transferring to the USAR Retired Reserve when leaving in an active status for soldiers under 60 years of age.



# OFFICERS CAREER NOTES



## BRANCH CHIEF'S NOTES

As I begin my first year in MILPERCEN, I look forward to serving Infantry officers and field commanders. As the Army becomes more dynamic, personnel management becomes more challenging. Today's Army is being changed by force modernization, regimental affiliation, COHORT, CAS<sup>3</sup> and a renewed emphasis on special operations. The Infantry is being significantly affected by all these factors and also by the dramatic impact of the new light infantry divisions and the addition of a Ranger battalion and a Ranger regimental headquarters. In spite of these challenges to personnel management, Infantry Branch is still committed to treating Infantry officers as people and not as numbers.

The organization of Infantry Branch has remained basically the same with one cell each for lieutenant colonels, majors, captains, and lieutenants and an additional cell for controllers of SC 54 and SC 18. Although the organization has not changed, many of the faces have, so pictures of the officers in each cell and their major duties are provided in this issue.

I look forward to the coming year and pledge that Infantry Branch will continue to provide the best possible personnel service.

Call or write if you have a problem. We need your input to do our jobs.

**LTC BILL HOYMAN**

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## USAWC CORRESPONDING STUDIES

Inquiries from the field reveal a lack of knowledge concerning the

U.S. Army War College Corresponding Studies Course (AWCCSC). This excellent but very demanding correspondence course provides senior service college (SSC) level education to deserving officers each year. But selection is competitive — only the best-qualified officers are chosen from those who apply.

The course, which is two years long, begins in July of each year. The curriculum includes two resident summer sessions of two weeks each at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, the first session after one year of study and the second at the conclusion of the course.

This is the only correspondence course that qualifies officers for Military Education Level (MEL) 1. Officers who want the MEL 1 qualification and who do not expect to be selected for resident SSC level instruction should apply.

To qualify, an officer must have between 15 and 25 years of Active Federal Commissioned Service (AFCS), must be a lieutenant colonel or a colonel, and must have a final TOP SECRET clearance. Applications must arrive at Headquarters, Department of the Army, by 1 February each year. (Army Regulation 351-11 provides additional information on application procedures.)

Board results are usually released in May of the year the application is made. The most recent list had a selection rate of 28.5 percent for basic branch officers with 149 officers picked from 519 applicants. Infantry had a selection rate of 29.7 percent with 27 officers selected as principals and six as alternates. Most of those selected were from Year Group 1964. All had undergraduate degrees, and most also had master's degrees. While many of those selected had not commanded battalions, most had served in high level staff assignments.

Officers who are interested in applying for the AWCCSC should remember that the program is very demanding. An officer must evaluate his present and projected workloads to determine whether he will be able to devote enough time to the course. If he cannot and must drop the course, he may not apply for reenrollment or reinstatement.

This is an excellent opportunity for eligible Infantry officers. Those who are interested should consult AR 351-11 or call Infantry Branch and talk to Major Bob Harper, AUTOVON 221-0208/0209.

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## ADVANCED SCHOOLING

The Combat Arms Division (CAD) has about 85 spaces each year for fully funded advanced civil schooling (excluding those officers who have follow-on assignments at the U.S. Military Academy). There are also some spaces each year for the Training with Industry Program.

An officer who is selected for advanced schooling studies at a civilian university in a discipline that supports either or both of his specialties for a period of up to 18 months. He receives a graduate degree and then must serve in a three-year Army Education Requirement Board (AERB) utilization assignment. The discipline allocations for Fiscal Year 1985 are in the additional specialties of 23, 25, 45, 46, 48, 49, 51, 52, 53, and 54.

To attend, an officer must be primary service qualified (must have successfully commanded a company and completed an officer advanced course), and he must have the following:

- An acceptable educational background and a demonstrated academic capacity to successfully complete the

**INFANTRY BRANCH TEAM**



MAJ Bob Harper  
LTC, Additional SC  
Branch XO



LTC Bill Hoyman  
Branch Chief



MAJ Richard Strube  
LTC, SC 11, Command,  
ROTC and DRC



MAJ Chris Brown  
LTC, Additional SC  
SC 54 Controller



MAJ Mike Van Buskirk  
MAJ, SC 11 and ROTC



CPT(P) Barry Wright  
MAJ, Additional SC



CPT(P) Spurgeon Moore  
MAJ, CPT, Additional SC  
SC 54 Controller




CPT(P) Jim Dezzutti  
CPT, SC 11, Overseas  
Post Advanced Course



CPT Steve Sittnick  
CPT, Additional SC



CPT(P) John Cray  
CPT, SC 11, CONUS



CPT(P) Jim Hogan  
SC 1B Controller




CPT Frank Wiercinski  
LT, SC 11



Ed Warren  
CPT, LT Advanced Course



Elaine Martin  
LT, SC 11 Accessions



CPT Dave Freeland  
Infantry Branch Rep.  
Ft. Benning, Ga.



selected course of study.

- A military service performance record that indicates his abilities and his potential for promotion and assignment to positions of increasing responsibility.

- A demonstrated potential for graduate study as determined by satisfactory scores on the Graduate Record Examination or the Graduate Management Admissions Test.

- Normally more than 5 and less than 13 years of active Federal service (AFS) when schooling begins, and not more than a total of 17 years AFS.

An officer must be aware, too, that he will have a mandatory 3-for-1 service obligation, not to exceed 6 years, at the end of his schooling.

Selection is based on a comparative evaluation of the overall military and academic records of the officers who have applied. Then there must be a validated AERB requirement in the discipline an officer has requested before he can be considered further.

Any university an officer selects (in accordance with the provisions of AR 621-1) and that CAD approves is acceptable so long as it offers a master's degree in the designated discipline. The university must be one that will grant the student in-state tuition rates, though exceptions can be made on a case by case basis. The tuition is paid by DA, and up to \$600 per year for books and supplies is also authorized.

During the schooling period, the officer student is assigned to the U.S. Army Officer Student Detachment, Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana, for administration. His progress is monitored by CAD through periodic grade reports.

Officers may apply for advanced civil schooling any time through command channels. Applications should be sent to DA, MILPERCEN, DAPC-OPE-PD, ATTN: Captain Yingling, 200 Stovall Street, Alexandria, VA 22332. For additional information, call AUTOVON 221-7820.

The Training with Industry Program, also governed by AR 621-1, sends an officer, usually for one year, to an industry in which he can learn

industrial management and procurement techniques. The officer is then assigned to a three-year utilization tour. The prerequisites, qualifications, and application procedures for this program are similar to those for advanced civil schooling.

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## VOLUNTARY INDEFINITE STATUS

Many U.S. Army Reserve officers find it difficult to understand why they have been selected for promotion to captain but not selected for retention on active duty in a Voluntary Indefinite status. Why this apparent conflict?

First of all, Voluntary Indefinite (VI) status applies to every U.S. Army Reserve officer who wants to be retained on active duty beyond his initial obligation.

After an officer files his application in accordance with AR 135-215 (not before he has completed 24 months on active duty and not later than six months before the expiration of his obligated service), his OMPF is carefully reviewed by a Combat Arms Division (CAD) board. If the board's first vote is favorable, the officer is granted Initial Voluntary Indefinite (IVI) status. This allows him an additional one-year probationary extension on active duty, and he incurs an additional one-year obligation (probationary).

During the eighth month of this probationary year, the officer's OMPF is again brought before a CAD board of officers, and they vote on his Final Voluntary Indefinite (FVI) or career status. This gives him an opportunity to remain on active duty until he has completed 20 years of active Federal service (predicated, of course, upon his remaining competitive). Only the best-qualified officers are chosen for FVI status.

CAD has the authority to approve IVI/FVI status for an officer but not to disapprove it. If CAD recommends disapproval, the applicant's OMPF is sent to the Officer Personnel Management Directorate (OPMD) Special

Review Board (SRB) for a final vote. The Board's recommendation is sent to the Director, OPMD, for approval. As constituted, the system includes many "check and balance" procedures to ensure that an officer is dealt with fairly.

So the answer to the question of how an officer can be promoted but denied VI status is simple. The DA selection board is looking for fully qualified officers. The VI board is looking for *best* qualified officers. Therefore, it is possible for an officer to be fully qualified and thus be promoted to captain, yet not be among the *best* qualified and thus not be selected for FVI.

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## DA FORM 2-1 CHANGE


Military personnel offices (MILPOs) no longer prepare and maintain Part II, DA Form 2-1, of the personnel qualification record for Active Army officers.

DA Form 2-1, the green, hard-copy record found in an officer's field 201 file, is a manual record that contains personnel management information such as duty assignments, awards, home of record and next of kin.

MILPOs now maintain only Part I, DA Form 2, of the personnel qualification record for information and accuracy of data for in-processing and annual audits of the officer's record brief (ORB). The DA Form 2 contains personnel information from the local automated data base.

The only record career assignment managers and selection boards now use on officers is the ORB, DA Form 37.

This change affects only Active Army officers; it does not apply to U.S. Army Reservists or National Guardsmen.



# BOOK REVIEWS



The office of the U.S. Superintendent of Documents again has told us of a number of recent publications that are now available from the U.S. Government Printing Office and that should be of interest to the military professional. Among them are:

• **FUNDAMENTALS OF TACTICAL COMMAND AND CONTROL — A SOVIET VIEW** (S/N 008-070-00514-0, 1984, 384 Pages, \$9.00) Brings to light Soviet theoretical principles of command and control in modern combat based on party resolutions concerning problems of control and on the experiences of past wars, military exercises, and changes in the means and methods of armed conflict.

• **DIRECTED ENERGY MISSILE DEFENSE IN SPACE** (S/N 052-003-00948-0, 1984, 104 Pages, \$4.50). Describes and offers assessment of certain "star wars" technologies that might form the basis of a future nationwide defense against Soviet nuclear ballistic missiles.

• **DEFENSE AGAINST BALLISTIC MISSILES** (S/N 008-047-00358-7, 1984, 32 Pages, \$1.50). Explains new possibilities for improving U.S. defenses against ballistic missile attack to further deter a deliberate attack. Also looks at a proposed combined U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative to slow the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to promote world peace.

As usual, all orders to the Government Printing Office must be accompanied by payment in the form of check or money order made payable to the Superintendent of Documents. Payment may also be made by VISA or MasterCard, with the card's expiration date being furnished.

We have received from the Army's Center of Military History its latest issue of **THE ARMY HISTORIAN** — Number 3, Spring 1984 (see **INFANTRY**, May-June 1984, page 44). It

contains a number of interesting essays such as "Answers About Additional Skill Indicator 5X," "Three Faces of Military History," and "Ten Important Books: Strategic Thought."

This quarterly publication is free for the asking to either military or civilian personnel. Requests for subscriptions should be sent to the managing editor, Bruce D. Hardcastle, U.S. Army Center of Military History, Pulaski Building, 20 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20314; AUTOVON 285-1278, or commercial 202/272-1278.

Stackpole Books (P.O. Box 1831, Harrisburg, PA 17105) has sent us the four most recent volumes — Numbers 7 through 10 — in its **TANKS ILLUSTRATED** series: **GERMAN TANKS, 1945 TO THE PRESENT**, by Peter Gudgin (1984, 72 Pages, \$7.95, Paperback); **U.S. BATTLE TANKS TODAY**, by Steven Zaloga and Michael Green (1984, 72 Pages, \$7.95, Paperback); **LAST OF THE PANZERS: GERMAN TANKS, 1944-1945**, by William Auerbach (1984, 64 Pages, \$7.95, Paperback); and **D-DAY TANK BATTLES: BEACHHEAD TO BREAKOUT**, by George Balin (1984, 64 Pages, \$7.95, Paperback).

Each volume is profusely illustrated, with the narratives based on the illustrations. Each is an authoritative and excellent reference source.

We also have another excellent reference book from the M.C.N. Press (P.O. Box 702073, Tulsa, Oklahoma 74170): **MEDALS, MILITARY AND CIVILIAN OF THE UNITED STATES**, by David Borthick and Jack Britton (1984, 290 Pages, \$12.95, Softcover). The authors account for more than 300 U.S. military and civilian medals and decorations from the earliest — the Andre Medal, created by Congress in 1780 — to the

latest, including the Multi-National Force Medal (Lebanon). Each medal is fully illustrated by a line drawing and described in considerable detail.

A four-page identification chart that shows 293 ribbons in full color is included, as is a separate section on appurtenances and devices.

And from the McLean County Historical Society (201 East Grove Street, Bloomington, Illinois 61701) we have received its recently published softcover book entitled **UNITED STATES MILITARY BUTTONS OF THE LAND SERVICES, 1787-1902**. Prepared by Martin A. Wyckoff (1984, 121 Pages, \$12.00), it describes the uniform buttons the U.S. Army used from 1787 to 1902, with references to the various sites where the buttons were found. The author's emphasis is less on the official usage of particular buttons than on their actual usage.

He also includes a proposed classification system. Although he designed the system especially for the archeologist, it does have general application. Based on the descending order of common elements, it shifts the emphasis away from the single specimen and toward the general group to which it belongs. He uses line drawings to illustrate the major characteristics of the various buttons.

Military historians and collectors should welcome this book, as well as the one from the M.C.N. Press.

Here is another interesting publication that has recently arrived in our office:

• **NORTH AMERICAN INDIAN WARS**, by Richard H. Dillon (**Facts on File**, 1983, 256 Pages, \$29.95). This is a profusely illustrated, easy-to-read account of the numerous wars that were fought between the Indians — the so-called Native Americans — and the white man between 1492 and 1891.

The bulk of the book concerns the



wars between the American settlers and the Plains and Prairie Indians from 1860 to 1890, a period the author calls "the bloodiest, most violent three decades in American history."

The author exhibits great sympathy for the Indians and deplores the way they were treated; he also extols their warrior virtues.

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**BROTHERS: BLACK SOLDIERS IN NAM**, by Stanley Goff and Robert Sanders, with Clark Smith (Presidio Press, 1982. 201 Pages. \$14.95). Reviewed by Dr. Joe P. Dunn, Converse College.

The title of this slim volume is misleading. It is not a study of Black soldiers in Vietnam. Rather, it is the personal memoirs of two young Black draftee "grunts." Because they are typical, their story takes on larger significance for all Black soldiers in Vietnam.

Statistical studies demonstrate that Blacks constituted a high percentage of combat troops, that they spent longer times in the field than did whites, and that they suffered a disproportionate share of casualties. If we attempted to profile the average Vietnam grunt, he would be a young Black with no more than a high school education and one who had little understanding of the war and cared less. He was merely serving his time and trying to stay alive.

Stan Goff and Bob Sanders fit the profile perfectly. They did not know why they were in Vietnam, and the war had no personal meaning for them beyond survival. Every grunt who "humped the boonies" can identify with their common experiences of horror, boredom, exhaustion, fear, comradeship, and occasionally, heroism in the field. But the authors go beyond these experiences to express the special affinity of race. The accounts of time in the rear, the funtionary jobs that allowed some grunts to escape the field, and the ephemeral days of R&R ring true for all combat veterans.

While Goff and Sanders were quintessential grunts, they were also distinctive. Sanders was airborne and

won the Air Medal; Goff received the Distinguished Service Cross, one of the highest awards for bravery that a soldier can attain.

Despite the scores of first person narratives on the war, few come as close to capturing the average grunt's life in the boonies as does this fine book. I recommend it highly.

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**ABSARAKA: HOME OF THE CROWS**. By Margaret Irvin Carrington (University of Nebraska Press, 1983. 284 Pages. \$7.95). Reviewed by Juana Wilson, Sheridan, Wyoming.

First published in 1868, this book is an authentic and fascinating chronicle of the 1866 military expedition that built and garrisoned Fort Phil Kearny, deep in Indian Territory. The author, a participant in the events, provides valuable insight into the history of the Indian wars that took place in the area that now encompasses the states of Wyoming and Montana.

The expedition was commanded by Margaret Carrington's husband, Colonel Henry B. Carrington of the 18th United States Infantry. His orders were to garrison Fort Reno on the Powder River and to build and garrison two new posts, Fort Phil Kearny (to be situated near the Big Horn Mountains in present-day Wyoming) and Fort C.F. Smith (to be located 90 miles to the north in present-day Montana).

The territory that Carrington was ordered to enter was acknowledged to be valuable hunting grounds that belonged to the Sioux, Cheyenne, Arapahoe, and Crow Indians. But a Treaty Council meeting that got under way at Fort Laramie during the summer of 1866 was expected to give the United States the right to build forts and establish a road through this part of the country. As it turned out, the Indian leaders did not ratify the proposed treaty. By then, though, Colonel Carrington's expedition was well on its way.

Mrs. Carrington managed to maintain a high degree of objectivity in the journal she maintained during the

course of the expedition, and it became the basis for this book. She sympathized with the Indian tribes, but remained loyal to the Army's cause.

The expedition did manage to build and garrison both forts, although hostile acts by the Indian tribes began to increase both in frequency and in intensity. Promised supplies and reinforcements failed to appear, and in the absence of cavalry, infantry had to be used in that role. Finally, the hostility of the Indian tribes culminated in the "Fetterman massacre" on 21 December 1866 near Fort Phil Kearny, an action that had a sobering effect on the rasher elements of the Army. These now realized that fighting the Indians was going to be considerably more than what in the Civil War they would have referred to as a patrol action.

An appendix to the book includes the report of the special commission that was sent to investigate the cause of the Fetterman debacle, as well as a historical sketch and a roster of the officers of the 18th Infantry.

Margaret Carrington, with her journal, made a unique contribution to the annals of the Indian Wars.

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**WITHOUT HONOR: DEFEAT IN VIETNAM AND CAMBODIA**. By Arnold R. Isaacs (Johns Hopkins, 1983. 559 Pages. \$19.95). Reviewed by Doctor Mike Fisher, University of Kansas.

The end came with surprising ease. In early March 1975, the North Vietnamese had attacked to the south through the central highlands in great force. Within days the South Vietnamese had crumbled and their retreat had gained momentum as panic spread and discipline vanished. By 30 April, the North Vietnamese had moved into Saigon virtually unopposed and their tank number 873 had slammed through the gates of the presidential palace, clearing the way for the ceremonial victory flag raising.

Behind that victory, though, ran a river of blood, for some two million

people had died during the almost three decades of war that had convulsed Vietnam. In this critical narrative, Isaacs, a correspondent for a Baltimore newspaper in Indochina between 1972 and 1975, tells the events of those three years, beginning with the signing of the Paris accords and ending with the collapse of both Vietnam and Cambodia.

He blends personal experience with extensive research to develop a work that is rich in detail and insight. He demonstrates an ability to move from the specific to the general, and uses his knowledge of the tragedies of that troubled land to analyze and dissect the policy and strategy that evolved half a world away in the United States.

As many veteran infantrymen will painfully recall, Vietnam proved almost unfathomable to most Americans. Isaacs addresses the convolution of our failed intentions with analytic compassion. His book provides invaluable insight into the largely unrecorded events that took place in southeast Asia following American disengagement. It also serves as a provocative if critical primer on American strategy and politics in the Vietnam arena. Isaacs' criticism of American policy has relevance for understanding the Vietnam tragedy and the present world situation as well.

His book captures the essence of the final years and of Vietnam itself. In that strangely beautiful land, idealism often foundered on the rocks of practicality. There, the plans that were so logically articulated in the conference rooms in Washington eroded before the shifting sands of a society that we never fully understood.

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**UNIFORMS OF THE INDOCHINA AND VIETNAM WARS.** By Leroy Thompson (Blandford, 1984. 160 Pages. \$17.95). Reviewed by Captain F.R. Hayse, United States Army.

As in his previously published *Uniforms of the Elite Forces*, Leroy

Thompson again shows us his avid interest in and favor towards elite military units. And again, as he did in his earlier work, he produces a number of technical flaws. For example, he identifies a U.S. Army Special Forces Mobile Strike Force (MSF) patch as belonging to the 5th Mike Force Command rather than to its actual affiliation to the III Corps MSF under B-36. And he shows an ARVN Special Forces shoulder patch being worn without specifying that the patch is an early — 1959-1963 — version.

These technicalities would probably mean little to the lay reader, but to the serious historian or knowledgeable professional soldier they illustrate a degree of superficial knowledge of U.S. special operations forces and a shallowness of research.

The book's title is also misleading — the text deals more with Thompson's simplified history of the 30-year conflict than with the military uniforms that were used in it. Despite the flaws, the narrative does read well and the photographs and illustrations do give a good representation of the myriad types of units, uniforms, and equipment that were used.

Although this book cannot be considered a must book to be read as a resource volume, interested readers will find it entertaining.

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**LANDSCAPE TURNED RED: THE BATTLE OF ANTIETAM.** By Stephen W. Sears (Ticknor and Fields, 1983. \$17.95). Reviewed by Captain Gustav Person, New York Army National Guard.

In the late summer of 1862, the Confederacy had reached what has been called its "high water mark." Formal recognition from France and Great Britain was expected almost momentarily. Since early in the year, General Robert E. Lee and other Southern generals had delivered a string of military victories that had buoyed Southern hopes for a final victory.

In early September, with the dual aim of taking the war into Northern territory and forcing the Northern

army to give battle, Lee and his Army of Northern Virginia entered Maryland. President Abraham Lincoln, casting about for a new commander for the main Northern force, the Army of the Potomac, reluctantly gave the command to George B. McClellan, the "Young Napoleon" of popular fame but a leader who had failed to crush the main Southern army several months before.

In this most recent treatment of the battle of Antietam, Stephen Sears weaves a controversial account of the campaign, told largely through a collection of eyewitness accounts from previously unpublished letters, diaries, and dispatches that were compiled by two officers after the war.

While the battle itself is described in rich and often harrowing detail, the events leading up to the battle are the most compelling. We follow McClellan, the skilled engineer and organizer, as he is overcome by caution and totally misled by his intelligence reports of Lee's strength and dispositions, even after a complete copy of Lee's plans falls into his hands. Lee, on the other hand, finally manages to concentrate his forces behind Antietam Creek and fights McClellan to a standstill.

This book could easily be subtitled "The Rise and Fall of George McClellan," and Sears condemns McClellan at every turn. Sears also feels that the senior commanders of the Northern army, with few exceptions, were all incompetent.

Admirers of George McClellan will find little in this book to recommend it. Infantrymen, though, will appreciate the praise the author bestows on the courage and staunchness of the ordinary foot soldiers on both sides. If nothing else, Sears' treatment of this battle, which was primarily an infantry battle, makes this book an important addition to the history of the period.

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**VIETNAM RECONSIDERED: LESSONS FROM A WAR.** Edited by Harrison E. Salisbury (Harper and



Row, 1984. 335 Pages. \$8.50, Paperback). Reviewed by Dr. Joe P. Dunn, Converse College.

I have looked forward to this book for more than a year, and I am sorely disappointed. Obviously this slim volume could not capture the realms of debate and controversy of the lively, heated four-day conference at the University of Southern California, from which the book came. But the brief inclusions are woefully inadequate. The slightly more than 300 pages are divided into 79 segments, few more than two or three pages in length. Several are a page long, and one is a single paragraph. The editor apparently wished to cram as many prominent names as possible into his table of contents.

The topics covered are the war itself; the role of journalists in it; the legacy of Vietnam for veterans and for the U.S. military services; the present state of Vietnam; and the Vietnamese people. None of these is developed in any detail. Left-leaning journalist-author William Shawcross's rethinking of postwar events in Indochina, with *mea culpa* overtones, is one of the more interesting.

For military professionals, the section on the effects and legacy of the war should be the most engaging. Here Salisbury is at his worst as he babbles clichés and stereotypes that are not consistent with the facts. He claims that a conspiracy of silence pervades the military services, that the war is not taught in the military academies or at the staff colleges, and that no major assessment has appeared in print. It would do Salisbury some good to consult the curriculum of the military schools, the pages of the war college journals, the current and projected volumes of the Vietnam War history projects, or the debate over Harry Summers' book.

The services may not have been as diligent as they could have been in reassessing their own tactical conduct of the war, but the subject of the Vietnam War is alive and well in the contemporary military services. The same cannot be said for this disappointing reincarnation from the past.

**WE WILL BURY YOU.** By Jan Sejna (Sidgwick and Jackson, 1982. 196 Pages. \$17.00). Reviewed by Lieutenant Bret G. Dalton, United States Army.

If you believe there is no worldwide, organized communist plot to overthrow the West, you are mistaken. Jan Sejna is reputedly the highest ranking communist ever to have defected. Formerly a Czech general and chief of staff to his country's minister of defense, he escaped to the United States in early 1968.

His book is divided into two parts. The first is an autobiographical sketch of his rapid rise in the Czech party; the second describes "the plan."

Sejna's position gave him access to "a detailed Soviet plan to subvert the West, country by country." His description of the four-part plan goes like this:

Phase I was the period of preparation for peaceful co-existence. This was roughly the period between 1956 and 1959, with Khrushchev and his destalinization program.

Phase II was "The Peaceful Co-existence Struggle," which ran from 1960 until 1972. During this phase, the East bloc was "to promote disunity in the West" through the manipulation of detente and the promotion of programs such as Willy Brandt's *Ostpolitik*.

Sejna says there are two major objectives of the third phase (apparently now in progress): the Soviet Union is to gain as much economic and technological assistance from the West as it can, and, simultaneously, this warming of relations will complete the erosion of NATO with the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Europe. Once this point is reached, the stage will be set for the final phase, "The Era of Global Democratic Peace," which supposedly will be about 1995.

The plan is a living document. According to Sejna, world events have altered the timetable, but have not changed the plan. His book is a concise work that is designed to enable all readers to gain a better understanding of the East bloc's mentality. It is

recommended to all who have any interest at all in the East-West conflict.

#### RECENT AND RECOMMENDED

**WAR AND PEACE: SOVIET RUSSIA SPEAKS.** Edited by Albert L. Weeks and William C. Bodie, with an essay by Frank R. Barnett. National Strategy Information Center, 1983. 51 Pages. \$1.95, Softbound.

**MILITARY POWER AND THE ADVANCE OF TECHNOLOGY.** New and Fully Revised Edition. By Seymour J. Deitchman. Westview Press, 1983. 278 Pages. \$27.50.

**THE UNKNOWN PATTON.** By Charles M. Province. Hippocrene Books, 1983. 261 Pages. \$20.00.

**EUROPEAN ARMIES AND THE CONDUCT OF WAR.** By Hew Strachan. Allen and Unwin, 1983. 224 Pages. \$12.50, Softbound.

**COMBAT WORLD WAR II: EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS.** Edited by Don Congdon. Arbor House, 1983. \$24.95.

**COMBAT WORLD WAR II: PACIFIC THEATER OF OPERATIONS.** Edited by Don Congdon. Arbor House, 1983. \$24.95.

**HARRIER: SKI-JUMP TO VICTORY.** Edited by John Godden. Pergamon-Brassey's, 1983. 132 Pages. \$9.00, Softbound.

**NORMANDY — OVERLORD.** By Tonie and Valmai Holt. Holt's Battlefield Guide Series. David and Charles, 1984. 64 Pages. \$3.95, Paperback.

**THE YPRES SALIENT.** By Tonie and Valmai Holt. Holt's Battlefield Tours. David and Charles, 1984. 48 Pages. \$3.95, Paperback.

**GOD ON OUR SIDE: THE BRITISH PADRE IN WORLD WAR I.** By Michael Moynihan. David and Charles, 1984. 231 Pages. \$18.95.

**WEST TO CAMBODIA.** By S.L.A. Marshall. A Reprint. The Battery Press, 1984. 253 Pages. \$16.95.

**TWICE THE CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY RESERVE, 1908-1983.** U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984. S/N 008-029-00126-8. 450 Pages. \$11.00.

**CURRENT MILITARY LITERATURE: COMMENT AND ABSTRACTS AND CITATIONS OF IMPORTANT ARTICLES FROM INTERNATIONAL MILITARY AND DEFENCE PERIODICALS.** Edited by Major General J.J.H. Owen, OBE. Volume 1, Number 3, 1983. Oxford: The Military Press, 86 Pages, Softbound.

**THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY: HISTORY AND DOCUMENTS.** Edited by William M. Leary. The University of Alabama Press, 1984. 190 Pages. \$9.95, Paperback.

**GERMAN MILITARY INTELLIGENCE IN WORLD WAR II: THE ABWEHR.** By Lauran Paine. Stein and Day, 1984. 199 Pages. \$16.95.

**THE GRENADA INTERVENTION: ANALYSIS AND DOCUMENTATION.** By William C. Gilmore. Facts on File, 1984. 120 Pages. \$14.95.

**THE ENGLISH CIVIL WAR, 1642-1651: AN ILLUSTRATED MILITARY HISTORY.** By Philip J. Haythornthwaite. Sterling, 1984. 160 Pages. \$17.95.

**THE SOVIET CONTROL STRUCTURE: CAPABILITIES FOR WARTIME SURVIVAL.** By Harriet and William Scott. Crane Russak, 1983. 142 Pages. \$7.95, Paperback.

# INFANTRY LETTERS



## ANTIARMOR WEAPONS

I noticed an error in Lieutenant Colonel Edward L. Oliver's article "Antiarmor," in your March-April 1984 issue, pages 20-21. The weapon identified as the German *Armbrust* is, in fact, the French *Strim*, and vice versa.

It might also be useful for your readers to know that the AC 300 Jupiter, developed by the French manufacturer Europac (*Societe Europeenne d'Armement Anti Char*) is not, as of now, in the French Army inventory.

GERARD BRUNE  
LTC, French Army  
French Liaison Officer  
U.S. Army Infantry School

## PLATOON "Y" DEFENSE

I recently read Platoon Sergeant David J. Robbins's "Platoon 'Y' Defense" in *INFANTRY* (January-February 1984, page 39) and have a few comments.

While the need for a 360-degree defense may require a formation that does not give maximum firepower in any one direction, if the direction of approach of the attacker can be determined in advance such a formation is not the best.

The proposed formation does give the firepower of two squads in any direction, but only two — it cannot bring the firepower of the full platoon to bear in any one direction. But this may be the price of achieving all-round protection, and the "Y" formation does seem superior to the older "circular" formation used for 360-degree defense.

I do question the positions given to a few of the weapons. If the APCs are

given the third position (I presume, to minimize the distance the troops have to go to and from the track), the vehicle will probably be positioned with its front toward the "front" of the position, exposing its rear to attack from another direction. Of course, in that case, the APC can move, but one of the strengths of the "Y" is that positions do not have to be changed regardless of direction of attack.

Also, the proposed placement of the machineguns gives no final protective fire line (FPL). A possible variation would be to place the machinegun in the second or third position, from which it could fire an FPL across the front of the adjacent squad. Each machinegun would have two FPLs, which would require a decision as to which one to fire. In most cases, however, it would be obvious, and in case of doubt the platoon leader could designate one of the two directions as the principal one.

Additionally, the third squad's machinegun could provide fire support with indirect fire, if used on a tripod with the traversing and elevating mechanism. Although this method seems to have fallen out of favor, it is still valid. In the second or third position the machinegun would be better placed to do this than at the end of the fifth position.

The APC could be placed toward the compass heading of the squad (positioned to use whatever ground cover was available for its sides, or dug in if time allowed), with the principal direction of fire of its heavy

machinegun on that heading.

If there were a rifle position out beyond the APC, it could protect the track against enemy infantry, and it could be closer to the APC than 30 meters. The heavy machinegun would fire over the rifle position in that case. Of course, it could cover any approach toward the center of the Y as well, if its principal direction was clear. It could even cover approaches along the axis of one of the other legs of the Y and could do this better than the light machinegun because of its greater range.

Despite these seemingly critical comments, I believe the "Y" defense is an excellent idea that deserves serious consideration.

A. MARK RATNER  
Nashua, New Hampshire

## ANOTHER VIEW OF "Y"

I am writing in regard to Platoon Sergeant David Robbins's article, "Platoon 'Y' Defense," in your January-February 1984 issue.

It is easy to understand Sergeant Robbins's misguided belief in the "Y"-shaped defense, because when we read the first paragraph we discover that he doesn't understand how to apply the principles of security, economy, and concentration to the defense.

He goes so far as to suggest that the requirement to establish a 360-degree defense can be best met by using a "Y" position that places the squads in three separate linear positions with only one flank of each making contact with the others.

In few instances will we know exactly which direction the enemy will attack from. Once we can ascertain where he will place his main effort,

We welcome letters from our readers and print as many of them as we can. We can't use them all, though, and sometimes the ones we do use have been around for a while before we find room for them. But keep writing on topics of interest to our readers, and we'll do our best to get your letters in, sooner or later.



we concentrate our forces (and resources) in that area while simultaneously using smaller forces to contain lesser attacking elements and to maintain security in those areas of the position not under attack.

It would be an exceptional situation in which a platoon would be required to repel an attack, say, along the long axis of a squad position; a third or even half of the platoon would take no part in the battle until the enemy was ready to assault their portion of the battle position.

Concentration of fire to turn back an enemy assault on one of the legs is not practical because, taking into account the confusion of battle and the proximity of the squad positions, friendly personnel would probably be in as much danger from friendly fire as from the assaulting troops. Using the "Y" position, it would be next to impossible to support another squad by fire under conditions of limited visibility.

There are some other disadvantages of the "Y" position: The squad positions can be easily isolated and the platoon defeated in detail, and the position is inflexible — it is not easily adapted for light infantry and cannot be used by units above the platoon as there is no secure area for combat service support elements.

Sergeant Robbins stresses the need for 360-degree defense, yet he envisions platoons in "Y" positions spaced 1,000 meters apart and on line to form a company battle position. Such a position can be quickly bypassed or defeated in detail with one platoon after another being isolated and destroyed.

I hope these criticisms will be useful to Sergeant Robbins and to the readers of *INFANTRY*.

DARRYL LEDBETTER  
CPL

Schofield Barracks, Hawaii

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### CHALLENGE ACCEPTED

This is in response to William Befort's letter on a replacement for

the bayonet (May-June 1984, page 49).

On behalf of the Infantry officers assigned to the Army Training Board, I accept Mr. Befort's challenge. Three of us will face him with bayonets, while he uses his bayonet replacement — a special sealed magazine of 10 rounds.

We have a special rifle for him — one with a ruptured cartridge case stuck in the chamber and a broken extractor.

VERNON HUMPHREY  
MAJ, Infantry  
Fort Eustis, Virginia

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### PURPOSES OF BAYONET

The detractors of the bayonet again miss the point, as does William Befort with his clever observation in *INFANTRY*'s letters section (May-June 1984, page 49).

I was a Marine Rifleman in 1954-56 and our bayonet instructor made it clear that the true purpose of the bayonet is the assault when your last round runs out and you find yourself on top of someone with no time to reload. Then it's shoot him if you can or stick 'im if you have to to save your life — that and nothing more.

Despite the fact that we were trained in classic bayonet fighting, no Hollywood-style steel-on-steel combat was seriously envisioned, nor were we burdened with any Spirit of the Bayonet nonsense.

Let's keep the bayonet, but let's keep it in perspective.

WARD WRIGHT  
SGT  
Pennsylvania National Guard  
Gettysburg, Pennsylvania

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### SQUAD BATTLE DRILL

I am very concerned about the training of the individual infantry soldier in the squad battle drill. I do not believe that it is being taught to its fullest extent.

On a recent training exercise in which I was squad leader, we were en route to our objective on a movement to contact when we were hit by a frontal enemy ambush. The reaction time of the squad was so slow that if it had been the real thing, half of them would have ended up as casualties. And a lack of training in squad battle drill was to blame.

What is battle drill? It is, as we have come to define it, the immediate action taken by a squad or a platoon to return fire and deploy against an enemy.

The organization of a rifle squad into two fire teams gives the squad leader two elements with which to provide fire and maneuver. Alpha team might be the maneuver element, with Bravo team being the support element, but their roles might change during the conduct of any action. For example, if the maneuver element is unable (because of enemy action or terrain) to close in on and destroy the enemy, the roles of the teams are reversed. The organization of two teams within a squad is flexible and allows for any change that a situation may call for. When the terrain offers good firing positions and more firepower is needed in the support element, the squad leader can borrow the extra firepower from the other team. Such a change takes time to accomplish, however, and the switch will result in a loss of precision for the smaller team.

The fire support element plays an important part in squad battle drill. It assists the maneuver element in its advance toward the enemy positions by engaging all known or suspected enemy targets. This firing continues until masked by the maneuver element. While aggressive in its action, it delivers constant fire on the enemy on the move. When the maneuver element masks its fires, the support element moves forward to help in consolidation.

The mission of the maneuver element is to close with and destroy or capture the enemy. The soldiers advance by using the available cover and concealment, adjusting their move-

ment according to the terrain. With proper fire support, they can move to within hand grenade throwing distance of the enemy.

We need to spend more time conducting such battle drills. (FM 7-10 covers all aspects of the squad battle drill.)

ROBERT A. LINTHICUM  
SGT  
Fort Ord, California

## TACTICS IN IOAC

In the first eight to ten years of an Infantry officer's career, attending the Infantry Officer Advanced Course (IOAC) should be an important step toward increasing his ability to command a company in a tactical environment. This course is the first time the Infantry School has the officer for a protracted period (six and a half months) for the purpose of military education. Unfortunately, though, this time is not being used to its full potential.

There is no doubt that IOAC does an adequate job of preparing an officer to serve on a battalion staff and of educating a future company commander in many of his administrative duties. But it simply does not do justice to small-unit tactics, which should be the main subject of a combat leader's advanced course. Actual company battle tactics receive only lip service, and if captains and lieutenants do not really understand small-unit tactics, it does little good to have them plan battalion level operations.

Although a large number of hours in the course — most of them, in fact — are devoted to tactical operations, the system through which the subject is taught allows little room for the development of initiative in tactical thinking.

The tactical situations presented in class are prefaced by in-depth reviews of the students' advance reading assignments, METT-T analyses, and up to three possible courses of action. This is accomplished through numerous maps and viewgraphs, which places the burden of classroom work

on the instructor, not the student.

In a typical four-hour block of tactics instruction, the first two hours normally consist of lecture, and in the third hour the students are presented with a map (normally the Bad Hersfeld area of Germany) and a hypothetical scenario that seldom changes between operations. In the scenario there is habitually a three-to-one or one-to-three numbers advantage, and the higher "commander's guidance" severely limits the student commander as to the options available. Scenarios in which the student's force is able to flank or envelop the enemy do not exist. Frontal assaults, despite what FM 100-5 (Operations) tells us, are the rule. Then the student analyzes the situation and writes paragraph three of a five-paragraph field order. Finally, in the last hour, "table groups" present their solutions on a "VGT map."

If the student's thinking (as restricted by the commander's guidance) is the least bit unorthodox, the instructor makes him aware of Infantry School doctrine, labeling him "too audacious." (One wonders how George S. Patton or "Stonewall" Jackson would have fared in IOAC.)

There are, of course, a few interludes throughout IOAC in which students actually "wargame" a plan of action they have been required to develop, but too few. And much of the real training value of these interludes is lost because too much time is given to planning (and writing another operations order) and too little to actually wargaming the operation. Besides, neither the students nor the instructors have much experience in executing or "playing" the game itself.

These, then, are the major criticisms — from our own experience in IOAC and from our conversations with many other IOAC students. But criticism is easy, especially for those of us who work in a system that tends to criticize everything it does or fails to do. It does little good to criticize, however, if we offer no suggestions for remedy.

Many suggestions for improving the tactics portion of IOAC have

been proposed, most of which would require a great deal of money and a complete change in the program of instruction. But there is a simple answer that would yield satisfactory results and a more tactically aware company commander — an answer that would involve only two major alterations in the course. The first change would be to adopt a basic doctrine advocated by General S.L.A. Marshall — that Infantry leaders should be taught *how* to think, not *what* to think. The second would be to incorporate military history and wargaming into the tactics instruction throughout the course.

These changes could be interrelated: Emphasizing history throughout would help train combat leaders how to think. (For officers who have had no actual combat experience, history is the only available window through which they can see some of the problems they may face in a future war.) If the students are to attain the ability to reason tactically under pressure, they should know the historical precedents of such things as the development of the basic forms of maneuver and how technology has altered these forms. They should also know the differences in small-unit force structure throughout the world, the principles of war and their pertinence in conducting combat operations, and the development of current tactical doctrine.

Each tactical concept presented in class should be prefaced by a short student presentation of a historical precedent, assigned perhaps at the beginning of the course. Delay operations, for example, could be prefaced by a short analysis of the Soviet Army's delay during "Barbarossa," followed by the techniques the Germans used against the Soviets from 1943 to 1945. Besides establishing the importance of history to tactics, such a program would also help assess an officer's ability to research, evaluate, write and orally present a topic paper.

The emphasis in the tactics instruction should be on the development of tactical thought, audacity, and independence of action. This does not mean a combat leader must be trained



to act independently of his commander's guidance, but he should develop the ability to do, without question, whatever is required as *he* is experiencing the situation.

To develop the ability to take this kind of decisive action, an officer must receive tactical training and must participate in small-group discussions using scaled terrain models such as those used in the DUNN-KEMPF and CAMMS simulations. This would allow the student and the group instructor to "see the battlefield," would reduce inane arguments concerning the placement of units or weapons, and would foster the creative use and discussion of terrain and tactics.

All the students in the class could thus become involved in executing the operation by using a "What now, Captain?" technique, under the control of the instructor. Thus, specifics instead of generalities in tactical execution would become the norm, and the emphasis would be on tactical thought where it belongs, instead of on the mechanics of writing a five-paragraph field order.

Another way to improve the students' tactical thinking would be to have Allied students and exchange instructors teach IOAC students the tactical adaptations and doctrine of *their* armies, not ours. This would

give the students first-hand experience in conducting tactical operations in various geographic locations and insight into the thinking, the capabilities, and the operational expertise of Allied forces. (Using Allied officers to teach U.S. tactical doctrine to U.S. combat leaders, as is now being done, is a misuse of a valuable source of military experience and ideas.)

If changes such as these were made in the course, how would they affect the testing program? Testing, to thoroughly evaluate a student's tactical ability, should be conducted in two phases: Phase one should be an objective, written test of the student's knowledge of the historical and doctrinal precepts taught during the course. Phase two should then present a tactical situation that requires the student to analyze the situation and prepare a complete five-paragraph field order. Each student should then brief his order to his peers and his group instructor on a terrain model. In this way he could be evaluated and graded on the plan's completeness and its tactical feasibility; its application of doctrine and principles of war; and the student's ability to present a clear oral operations briefing.

Students would thus be able to clarify any misunderstandings of their orders (the same as they do as

Infantry small-unit commanders). They would also become aware of any mistakes or shortcomings in their testing immediately instead of waiting for a computer-generated grade slip to come out and then arguing a misconception weeks later. Although such testing would require more time than is now allotted, it would yield a much truer evaluation of a student's actual understanding and use of tactics.

Tactics are as varied and personalized as fingerprints, but unlike fingerprints, they are constantly being altered. This individuality in tactical thought is based on the human brain, which has been called the only computer-like system that could withstand the complexities of the modern battlefield, and must be nurtured and developed so that our combat leaders do not become automatons on the battlefield.

Certainly, a great many U.S. Infantry captains are quite competent in small unit tactics, but the Infantry School is not presently developing those who are not. The U.S. Infantryman deserves superior company commanders and IOAC must do its part to see that he gets them.

MICHAEL PHIPPS  
F.R. HAYSE  
CPTs, Infantry

# Infantry

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## CONGRATULATIONS

Please add this letter to the stack of letters congratulating Major Vernon W. Humphrey on his series, "Winning at the NTC." I hope you will consider extending this series.

Major Humphrey's observations and teaching points can reach those of us who are not in a unit scheduled for training at the NTC, those who are not tactical operations observers or controllers at the NTC, and those who are in the Reserve and the National Guard. We need to learn from others' mistakes if we cannot be there ourselves.

His straightforward style explains the lessons learned, and I feel the extension of his comments can only strengthen our Infantry and your magazine.

W. MICHAEL GRIGGS  
LTC, Infantry, USAR  
Enumclaw, Washington

## BLAZE

Among my mementos of Army years, I found this blaze. (At least that's what they were called in 1949-50.) When I got it I was assigned to Company A, 1st Battalion, 14th

Infantry Regiment at *Camp Carson*, Colorado. We had volunteered for ski training and were issued the blaze to wear over our 5th Army patches during Exercise Sweetbriar in Canada and Alaska from January to March 1950. The 4th Infantry Regiment in Alaska were the aggressors for the exercise, and the other friendly forces were the 1st Battalion, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry, and the Canadian Royal 22e Regiment.

We spent about three months maneuvering from Whitehorse,



Canada, to Northway, Alaska, in an exercise that some people thought we couldn't do. Our ski instructors were Finns who had fought the Russians in the Russo-Finnish War, and they knew what to do in the Arctic.

If any of your readers recognize this blaze and have any more information about it, I would appreciate hearing from them.

KENNETH C. DUMLER  
Box 32  
Davenport, Nebraska 68335

## PHILIPPINES REMEMBERED

On 20 October 1944, U.S. troops landed on Leyte Island in the Philippines. One of the four divisions participating was the 24th Infantry Division. In remembrance of that landing 40 years ago and of those who took part, the 24th Infantry Division Association will operate a Special Event Station, K4TF, from Merritt Island, Florida.

The Association will offer a special commemorative certificate to any amateur station making two-way contact with K4TF during the 24-hour GMT period of 20 October. Operations will take place about 10kHz inside the general portion of each amateur band. Bands to be used will be dependent upon propagation conditions. Certificates will also be available to short wave listeners who submit correct reports of reception.

To obtain a certificate, anyone who is interested should submit a QSL card and a large (9x12-inch) stamped self-addressed envelope to K4TF, 1630 Venus Street, Merritt Island, FL 32953. A smaller envelope will do if you don't mind having your certificate folded.

WILLIAM C. WILLMOT

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# From The Editor

## READER SURVEY

Our thanks to those of you who responded to our recent reader survey. (We sent two copies to each of 500 randomly selected infantry companies — Active Army and Reserve Component — and asked that an officer complete one of them and a senior NCO the other. We also sent survey forms to 200 randomly selected paid subscribers.) We trust that this representative sample more or less speaks for the rest of you as well.

We were pleased that more than half of you read most of each issue, that more than half use INFANTRY in preparing reports or training materials, and that almost all rate the writing style of our articles as generally clear and easy to understand. We were pleased, too, that most of you, after you've seen the magazine, either leave it in the dayroom, keep it for unit reference, or pass it on to someone else.


As in previous surveys, the subjects most of you said you would like to see covered more often were tactics, weapons and equipment, training techniques, leadership and command, and combat developments (in that order). But many also wanted to see more on NBC warfare and training, logistics and maintenance, and special operations — countering insurgency, terrorism, and the like.

As for your specific comments, it's a little hard for us to comply with all your wishes. Some of you said we should publish more historical articles; some said less. (We try to use history with lessons learned that are still valid.) Some of you said we should use longer articles; some said shorter. (We use both long and short articles.) Some said we should aim at higher unit levels; some said lower. (Our stated mission is to reach company-grade officers and senior enlisted personnel — mostly at company level.) Some said they found training tips from other infantrymen helpful; others (only one, actually) complained about "instant experts." Perhaps what this tells us is that no matter what we do someone is going to disapprove. Still, we'll try our best to learn something from all the comments — something that will make INFANTRY even more useful to infantrymen around the world.

As always, some of you wanted us to publish more often, and we sincerely wish we could. (We've got lots of good articles on hand and no space for them.) But budget restrictions prevent it. Some of you wanted more copies for your units, but that's not possible right now either because of restrictions from higher headquarters.

Anyone who did not receive a survey form but would like to comment on what they think about INFANTRY and what they'd like to see us doing that we aren't doing is welcome to write us any time.

Keep in mind, too, that our readers are often our writers as well. So if you have special experience or training in any of the many subjects mentioned on the survey, you might want to consider writing an article for us. Even if you've never written for publication, we'll do all we can to help you get it into print.



FLARE

## *TAKING COMMAND*

*Most come with a plan  
Eager, hungry and grand,*

*But those who will succeed  
Will see where we bleed*

*Where the heart beats  
And the flowers bloom.*

*So when you begin  
Remember the end.*

*Walk slow, listen and feel,  
And command, for your soldiers,  
Will be a great deal.*

*A SOLDIER*